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-I pray first for the forgiveness of my 
sins; that everything may be forgiven 
me. Next I pray that I may be free 
from despab" at the hour of death. And 
then too I pray for something I dea.rly 
wa.nt, namely that I may know a. little 
beforehand when death is coming. 
Spren Kierkegaard 
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INTRODUCTION 
F~eedom is a major theme ro~ the intelleotuals ot this poat-
~ode~n age. No doubt the main oause of this springs trom oon-
~empo~ary attacks aga1nst freedom. The ohains and fetters of CO~ 
Plunism threaten to bind mants external f~eedom. What 18 worse. the 
~nviaible hand ot materia11sm threatens to squeeze the very lite 
~rom man's internal freedom. This double th~eat--and in many In-
iStances, what was once a threat is now an aotuality ...... has not crept 
~nto our lives unnotioed. The men who today are thinking o~ 
~houghts for tomol'Tow. are doing 80 in terms ot freedom. When we 
~irst read what they have to saY'. it is somewhat bewildering, tor 
~hey have evolved t~eedom. tpom a llbe:Mlm arbltrl~ to a dynamio 
prooess of beooming.1 Beooming what?: . Beoo14ing actually the full 
• 
. '
puman person which 11es within the potential of each individual. 
The twentieth oentury has thus learned to view freedom a8 an 
~vo1ution of the ~uman pe~sonality. This 18 partioularly true ot 
IThis 1s not to say that treedom as becoming 1s a new concept 
~or philosophers. Berdyaev points out that St. AugustIne taught 
that t here are two freedoms, libertas minor a.nd libertas maior. 
"The lesser treedom was the beginnIng, i"r-eedom to ohoose the good, 
rlhioh supposes the possibilIty of sin; the greater treedom was the 
~nding, freedom in God, in the bosom ot good." ott NIcholas 
~erdyaev, Dosto1ev!!l, tr. Donald Att~ater (New York. 1934), p. 68. 
We mean to stress nere the present day emphasIs on this conoept and 
~ ts development in modern thought. 
1 
he European mind as is evidenoed by the philQsophioal literature 
roduced on the ContInent during the past seventy yoar8. 2 More-
ver, the Frenoh-German school of existentialism is the hard core 
rreedom.-theme. One need only list the nameS of Gabriel 
Je~ .. Pau1 Sartzte, ,Martin Heldegger, and Carl Jaspers to see 
he truth of this statement. How~ver fa.uon these authors ma.y dlff. 
n other respeots, they are at one in their agreement that fzteedom 
s the evolution of a. human personality. Thls theme Is, if we may 
se the phrase, of the easenoe of existentialism. And as existen-
IalisM.is a ohild of two world wars, so fJ.'l'eedom, or the laok 
hereof, 18 a proper tea~ure of the twentieth century. Freedom was 
o common a possessio~ that men took it for granted unt~l thel~ 
1d on it became less secure.. Nationalism and Industrlalis~, fop 
11 their worth, presented the occasion for thIs diSintegration of 
Exlstentialism, espeoia~ly 1n its freedom theme, be • 
.. 
. '
both an expression of and reaotion against this dlsintegratl0 
This problem ot freedom dId not arise from abstract specula-
ion. nor did it end there. Praottoal implieations drew It out of 
he realm of philosophy into that of theology. Consequently, these 
2rt may be asked why this freedo~theme is more proper to the 
mind than to the AIllerioan, A plausible explanation was 
by GuIdo de Ruggie~ 1n his short work on existentialism. 
here he explained that the destruction of two world Wttrs had bowed 
;urope to the verge of disintegration or soul. In the loss ot 
heir respect for the human person, Europeans lost their freedom. 
y escaping these scars ot war, America also escaped what RUggiero 
eteI's to as the pessimism ot existentialism. Consequently, tree-
om and other existentialistic themes are conspicuously absent fro 
erica. ot. Guido de Ru i8ro Elatential am New York 1 8. 
3 
same thougftts on treedom are contained in the works ot such a 
spiritual w~iter as Romano Guardlnl. He writes: HOod's power is 
love. God' a will 1s love. By directing IUs love toward man, God 
enables (,1an to becom.e what he essentially waG meant to oe--a tree 
per!3on, The more aotually a man is led by Godts love, the more 
fu.lly he realizes his true self; the more immediatel,. a man's aots 
spring from love, the mox-a completely they become his own."3 This 
SDain is a.n interpretation of' freedom. in terms of becoming one t III 
self. 
No one can doubt that the problem of freedom is oontemporane-
OUSt At the same time, however, it must not be said that the seeds 
of this problem were first planted in the soIl of the twentieth 
century. The roots of this emphasis on and development of freedom 
flsbecomins rea.oh back to the .first half of the eighteen hundreds. 
These ideas on freedom were then formulated for the first .,t irne bY' 
rehe philosopher who is tt)day referred to Ei.S the father of existen-
rtiallsm, Spren Aabye Klerkegaard. 
The Riddle of Lite 
~Lire has Interested me most in virtue of reason and freedom, 
and to eluoidate and solve the riddle of lIfe has alwa.ys been flf3' 
iesire. u4 Spren Kierkegaard penned this entry into his journal 
lHomano Guardinl, The Faith &nd Modern Mao, tr. Charlotte E. 
Forsyth (New York, 1952T; p. 3~. --- ---
4S.oren Kler-kegaard.. The Journals of S~ren Klerkegaard. ed. and 
4 
when he VIas twenty-two Y$ars old. / 1'01' the next twentY' years, 
until his early death in 1855, this "melancholy Dane" devoted h1m-
self to the intellectual and moral task of probing into this prob-
lem of life, the riddle ot treedom. 
This self-appo1nted task led Kierkegaard sImultaneously 
throu8::h the triple career of theologian, psychologist and philo-
sophett. His deep, sensitIve nature enabled him fully to assim11at~ 
each of these .lem.ents, and h1s unusual intellectual a.oumen managec 
to produce abrll11ant refleotion of all three as one. Practioally 
everything he wrote is at once theologioal, metaphysical; and 
psyohologioa.l. His conoern was not so much to explain life as we 
understand it, but rathor to expla1n 11fe as we live it. To leave 
in writing a mirror of Christian lifel This was the achievement 
that S.K. amb1tioned, the vocation to which he felt oalled; and 
when he died at t he age of forty-two, he had approached amazingly 
near to this ideal./ 
( 
Klerkegaard believed that freedom plays a major role in the 
life of a true Christian. The purpose of this thesis will be to 
determine the exact nature of dialectioal freedom and the plaoe it 
oooupies in S.K.'s religious thought. The reason for calling this 
freedom udlaleotloal" will become apparent in the following chap-
tel's. 
Before ooncluding this introduction, we must first (1) Indl-
trans. Alexander Dru (London, 1951). P. 7. 
5 
oato the extent to which freedom has been treated in K16rltegaard1a.r: 
Ii tOl"'atu.re; (2) briefly outline S.Kt s philosophy, tho better to 
isolate our problem of freedom; (3) present the method to be 
~mployed In this thesis; (4) give a sketoh of Klerltogaard t slife. 
Secondary Source. 
Althour,h a i;reat deal of K:terlr.egaardlan sohol-arship has ap .... 
peared in the past twenty years~ little of it has been devoted to 
the pl"eolsetopia ot freedom. By fa.r, most of this literature 
t 1::'9 at s the genoral soheme 0 r S. K. t s ph1l 0 sophy, and s Inoe 3", K. 
wrote s5)&ringly of freedom in his major philosophioal works. 
PhiloaophlQal Fragments nnd C ..oncludlnp; UnscientIfic PostsoriRt, 
most tr;atments refleot a bare minimum on this topio. In tl;lot, 
avon those authors who do ;nontion free'jom expllaltly, suoh as 
';'Vysohogrod. C1:'oxa11, <lnd Gollins, do~ So mainly on the strength of 
oertain passages 1n the Fraeaent~. These passages reveal that 
Kierkee:aardian freedom 1s dtaleotloal, but they do not indioate 
the natu.l."'e of this dlaleotio. Regis Jolivet has published a short 
but exoellent article on this topic in whloh he tl"'eats the two 
questions of the possib11ity of finite freedom and the exeroise 
of this freedom,," He clearly d istlnguishes between physioal free-
dom and dialeotical freedom, but he explains the latter mainly 
throuGh neGation and so fails to reveal adequately its positive 
I 
.sne'gis Jolivet. "Kicrkegaard at La Llberte de Cholx," 
iKierke'7:aard Svmnosion .. on. 107-111.. 
6 
nature. 
K161'ltegaard's PhIlosophy 
The l1mits of this thasis do not extend beyond the problem 
of freedom in Kierkegaard. hut since this is but a part of a 
larger soheme, it may help first to outline the structure of his 
philosophy. 
Life, according to S.K., is divided into three staees: the 
aasthetleal, ethioal, L'1.d religiouS. 6 Bet'ween any t"NO stages 
yawns a chasm. that cannot be bridged by 1"ea80n. but only by a per-
sonal leap. 3r1stly, the aesthet1cal lifo 1s an oxistence devoted 
to the delights of beauty and pleasure. Tho aesthete is inbred, 
suspicious, and reserved. He lacks freedom of choice and is de-
termined by his appetite for hedonism and materialism. Unless 
this individual eventually leaps to .:tp.e ethical sphere" his life 
becomes one of melancholy and despair; for the moment of pleasure 
is transitory and cannot be grasped with finality. The ethioal 
life, on the other hand, breaks the bonds cf detertlinism. The 
ethioal man absolutely ohooses himself and in this choice finds 
freedom. It 1s his characteristic to be open and communieative to 
6The chief souroes for an understanding of the aesthetleal 
sphere are the comments of Judge William, the ethioist in Either. 
Or, II. the ocmments of Frater Tac1turnus in the third part of 
1!taf~s on Life' s ~HJ and the postfJcr1pt. The ethical st~age 1s 
bes expY'aIne(I"!n' ther/.Q£, II, and !nPnVarious Observations 
about Marriage" in the Sta~es. Fear and Trembling is the best 
presentation of Kierkegaill" t S :!'eIT;Ious stage. 
jiP 
7 
his fellow man. Since he is free. the choice of good or evil en-
tars his life. The ethical '.lan chooses good by expressing the 
uni versal aotion of nen. In th :.8, Kierkegaard has merely adopted 
the categorical imperative of Kant lnto his o,vn thou;~;ht. This 
cthical sphere, however, :ttl basIcally unstable, for it" he chooses 
evll, man drags himneli' baok to the aesthet~cal sta.ge. and should 
he choose C'ood, he is eventually faoed with a choice that is not 
universal but subjectivoly p0r~lonal, and to make this choice he 
must leap to t;he sphere of l"'ell i:::;ion. 
Method ot Thesis 
The above outline of S.K.' 8 philosophy forms the baokground 
for our study of KierkeSaardian freedom. The sources for this 
study will be mainly S.K.' 8 own works,7 but not 1-l11 of them. The 
mo st important as well as t;hf' most d1ffiou1 t element in this 
problem is the pI'{'lper assessment of fr-eedom wi thin the c.ialect!.cal 
process of Klerkegaard t S ps:rchology of :nan. Consequently J the 
fundamental ideas about freedom will be taken'from KierkelY,aard's 
psychologioal work. Siokness ~ Death. Nowhere else does 
Kierkegaard penetra.te 80 dt1sply into the psychology of freedom in 
7As has been ::nent:1oned above, there is very little secondary' 
source r:laterial to be found on th:i.fl topio of dialeotical freedom .. 
KlerkegHardian scholarshtp :1s yet young, and has thus far confined 
itself to S.K.ts more prom1nent works. Any treatment given to 
Sickness unto Death and his rell::ious works is 8caroe. Conse-
quently, relerenoes to secondary"" sources in thls thesis will be 
minimal. 
8 
terms of the constituents of b fling: as he does in this masterpiece 
of personal p~ychology. Thin book explains moP€) clearly what S .. K. 
unders toad by human tree,dom tha,n his strIctly philosophical works, 
Fra~ents and the rosts~r1p~. 
After present:tng this struotare of freedom. v'Ie will then be 
in a position to see how his reliJ:11ous Vlorks confirmed and ampl1-
fled Vli1at S.K. had previously wr1 tten in Sloltness 1.1n,t£ Deat~. Thl~ 
confirmation and amplifica.tion will be drawn from. hIs reli,.:lous 
w~i tinrs rn the!' than from LiJ.s a.esth~tioal in erdar to avoid the 
problem of pseulonymns in his authorship. Kiel"k;egtlard felt that 
his 't/Clcatton as a.n author had been ,si ven him by God. He rel t a 
Di vine calling to lead his contemporar1es ba.ck to true Chr1stianltl 
by tn.oans ot the written VJord. HO\"lever ho also }mOth· the whims and 
moods of men well enough to rea.llze that he must first approach 
his reading public 1n a modified manaer. When <),(').:':l.lln2; with a.n 
aosthete, tl one does not begin thusi t'am a Chr:ist:1an; JOu are not 
a Christian. Nor does Dne be b1n thus: It 1s Christianity I am 
proclaiming; and you are living in purely aesthetic oategories. 
~ro. one begins thus: Let us talk about aosthetics. ,,8 In ol"der to 
adapt himself to this approaoh, Kierl:e€6,ard was forced to V1ri te in 
a ma~'1er centrar,. to his personal cc;nvictions. The thou,r;:hts of 
Joha.nnes the SeduceI' cr even those of Judge Willia.m, tL10 ethical 
thithor, are not necessarily the t.houghts of Kierkesa.ard. To solve 
4 • 
8g~ren K1erkegaard. 
(London. 1(11)0). o. ·'kl • 
'rho Point of View. tr. Wa.lter Lew rio 
............ ....................... 
9 
tlrct 
9g1c1,ness unto Doath is: t~elr hi pseuJonymoU$ We r'k, HOWeVBl', 
as Dl".'·'to'w~re"r)ornt8 ouE. Klor.kvt~aard d1d n' .. ,t ~nt~nd it to be #0 1 
the same Sonne u.s h: s ao&thct Lea.l fill" t1:1f~s. "Tht:l ps~;ud(mY1u was 
dopted m~:"ely to relieve hls (rllfn fine feelin!! '(,')f r,rrop1"ioty. It 
';l,u;:;;.t bo l.mdorstood also that this form of pSGudony:111ty wa~ totally 
1ttol:'tln~ tl'On'l thtlt whioh hi th~u'to he had ulu,d. In the ease ot 
the other p$E\u<knYttlous works S.K. "lac scrupulous to make thatcxt 
f"P{;'H.I' wi to to h.e ob.al--!lO tar b.a asor' bed to thf) pseudonym_ Hence h~ 
UlS ..1u:;;tH"!'od in afr~l":nirt; lnat n:. t a \W~..;rd lltt~r{~d by hts ps()urlo .... 
,.ma could pl.'Icrpel"ly be referl.'*"ed to him na an expreIH~1(,1n or his 
per:.'..>cnal v tew. 'Tht'H"O is n'-ctdn.::: (if the :'0 rt here. fc.~· these late~ 
"or1u were the alue.Net expression of' hIs own hellier, a'1d he had 
cx.peotEhl to publleh thtl!u tmdel~ hls:;,wn ru:.l.:;lO. ThQ;Js&udcn~r;';:l \"UHi an 
aftl!n')thou:;:ht." ~r&n Kier.kef;f.tSttd, .'t!l!. *q~e~a l.¥'l~o l~o.tlA. tr, 
WaltoI" l.owrie (?rlneeton, 1944), pp. xvfl .... !!!. 
10 Spren Kie rke gaar:t A. ... C .... on~·~:.: 1.u=+fi:;;,n~.~~w=-:.:..y;.,;:;.JTI:rT:~~~~ 
s tr Davia F. ~ . 
10 
His Life 
Thera are few philosophers whose pO:Nl':mal hlst:::ry is so in-
te1'S.ral to t heir thought as is the dramatic ex.i stance of Spron 
Ki€rkegaard. 
Spron Aabye (1813 - 1855) was the last of seven children born 
to Michael Kierkegaard, the man destined to be the greatest single 
influence in the 11re of this future philosopher/theologian. As 
fa. .louth, apron was a constant companIon to his father. The two 
would often pace to and fro in the confines of their living room 
while the father vividly descr1.bed the:) treets of Paris or London, 
or even Copenhagen. The quick imagination of young 5pren rapidly 
developed to match that of his father's. Moreovcl', his intellec-
tual powera of concentration and debate responded to the stimula-
tion of hIs fatherts quick jibes and penetrating thought. These 
iJ'laginatlvEI excursions left their imI}~~S8 on S.K.'s oersonality. 
Later on, he was to place i~3reat stress upon the imaginatlon as s. 
key to understanding the psychology of man. What is more, this 
Jolltude with h1s father intenslfled a natural introversion. Spr-sr 
beoam.e highly sensitive, and throughout his life always reacted 
Violently to the least stimulus. 
Above all, S~:rents early education was religious, puritanioa.l .. 
ly reli,~ious. He loarned to Jrncw his Croator not as a God of love 
b:lt ns a Cod of wrath. All th':'s early forr:::ation t.ook ;")1"1c8 under 
the oareful guidance of hIs i'ath{H'. Then this {wntinulty of life 
suddenly collapsed in hifJ twentv-first yea:!:" wilen his father 1'6-
11 
venled to him the.'eason for his intenso religious traintns. The 
truining h~,d been an attempt on hls father t s nart to repair his 
own sinful break from God. One dej, :rea.rs EHlrlier, Mlohael 
Kiel"k02;auI'd, mentally slcl(oned by the s:}ualor and contemptabl1it,. 
of his llffil, tH1.d raised his fist a.gainst heaven and blasphemed hie 
God. Strangely enough, his material security in 'life increased 
almost immediately. Lator, \Yhile h13 first wife wa.s st111 living, 
~<.tlchaal ;~ad 1. i ved in sIn '\VI ttl t ha <Ii'Joman who \Vas to he tho mother 
of his ~0ven children. Herel t t,hat God, EL'1sered by this twofold 
ofr€m~Je. had deotded to heap punlahm-ent upon hts family. It waa 
an nttempt to save hia youngest and favorite non from this Otll"86 
that aocouni;ed fOl' this purl tanioal upbringing. 
This knowled,r,e of his fe.thei.t:3 guilt oraolted the int:3gr1ty 
of.' Spren':1 p61'sona11 ty. He turned f:r;tom his f'atilEH' I.~nd from the 
puritanism of his father' s teaoh'_n:"~. ~ .Several years pa£wed before 
• 
this gap was breached by 3p:r;ten t a aympathetto understllndlnfj of his 
father't s sins in the lizhtot his own. 't,feanwhlle, he had survived 
tfl,,, c.r;.tlcal point ot his Oy''n e.xi~;teneaf a strange love-affair 
with a young girl, Regine Olsen. In lrutO, Kierkegaard. then tw.n~~ 
eight, beca.rn.e engaged to the eighteen year old Regina. They Viere 
deeply in love, but the cver-wrouf~~htJ highly sensitive Kl€ll"'kegaard 
beoame convinoed that tn marriage hiD r:.wn w101cednElss would deetzao,. 
the odness of hts wife, Durin,:; th.o final two months of this 
engagement, Kierkegaard experienoed the oonfliot of exlstsnoe a8 
. he tried to get Regina to break c<ff from h.im" Eventually, he was 
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foroed to ;nake the break himself. Looking back, he con8id3rod 
th:ts the turning point in his I1fe, and the oulk of hi!3 writings 
are devoted to an explanation of the final tt70 flonths of hln en ... 
poetic st!'ain Is rrodomlnDnt throu~~;hout hts entire nut':1.orship. 
After thts unusual oxperl,,~nce with Re'::lne, Kierltegaard tu,rned 
author. DnrinG this pel"iod of his Ilfe, one event in particular 
deserves mention here. That is hls polemical confliot 'a1 th a 
Copenhag~n newspaper, t~e ftCorsair ft • Without ~olng into detall, 
suffioo it to say that S.K .. founi hims~ol!' 12eLl up for puhlic soorn 
und ridicule 'tveck after weele durin.; thi3 journalistic dIspute. AI) 
teli.S le.ft a decp ir'1},)res.!:lion upon K1erkegaard.. The jeer:) and laugh-
':1tl(it .Iou l;:>va. From his conflict wi tli the "COl-sair," he learned 
what i t ~ilcans to be I'o jeoted by love, to be lonel:"', to bo em out .... 
cast. no doubt this latter event wv.s foremost in his ;.';10nory when 
he later wrote: "The h1€;;hest thine; ist while bel!'!£; ab:wlutely 
heterogeneous wtth the 1:1orld by serving Ood <llone, to remain in 
the world and in the midst of r'('Hl.l1ty. betor"e the eyes :xf all .. -for 
then perneoution 1s un&voldable."ll F0!' Klerkagaard, thls was 
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phrlst1an piety: t.o ronounce everythinr, in order' to S61"ve Cod 
le.le,ne.--and then to hDve to suffer for it, to do ~::ood and h!~ve to 
anere r for it, 
':':Jese v.!'e the P1D.jor elements in Kierkeeaardt slife whlch 
every reRr~or m.ust keep in mind as he turns the paf:~es written by 
this personalist. The elal":!. ty of his life illill1l1nes the diffloul-
~y, and at times ob8cur:tty, of 11.::.8 ccrnposltlon. The pathos of his 
perscnal life beoame tho honrt ct bis authoI>shlp. ~!Tuoh cf' this 
I£:r:Ul be lest hecaUBO cf t~~e snalytlc nature of the ohapters \vh1oh 
rol101tJ, but the true flavor of Ki€rltegaard t s personalism w11l 
ll\"'J/lyS he Clvs.lls,hle for t;he reader in h1s wcrks as he wrote th.Gm. 
p 
P'l'ER I 
On Wednesday, April 19, lahu, Klerkegaard wrote: nNE NB My 
whole being is ohanged. My reserve and self-isolation 1s b roken--
I r1.ust speak. L01'd g1 ve thy g raoe. ttl This cry em(H':~ed r:..~om the 
depths of his harassed sOlll a.s it struggled 1"'01"1 self-emancipation. 
EL:ht years had passed since he had broken his encagement to Regin~ 
and he was still engulfed In the struf:';~;le highllf?;hted by tha.t 
separation. The fight to free himself from aesthetioal inwax'dnesa 
was a fight again~t elements deeply embedded in his nature. 
That S.K. was aware of Regine's 1'016 as antagonist in tihis 
drama i3 evident from what he further wrote on t hut s arne Wednesday 
in 18)+8: 'tAlas, she could not break~.he silence of my melancholy. 
'rhat I loved her ... -nothinc; is more certaln ... ·and thusrny melancholy 
rHceived enough to feed upon, oh, it reoelved a terrible addition. 
It is essentially owing to hel"', to my melancholy and to my money 
t{Iat I became an author. Now, vdth Godts help, I shall be '!fly-
selt, I believe that Christ will help !:t6 to be victorious over my 
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lelnncholy. ,,2 Al though thls QPpea!~s to be U o11max in K1orkogaard.' 
!retltling VJ1th tl'SedOml it was not. On tbe oontr-ary, it was on11 
un tntensification of the struggle. Four days later, on Ea.ster 
:fonday. he agaIn put h::ts pen to paper, but this time to w:r.'"i tat 
iff No, no, '!11Y self-isolation .t;annot be broken, at loast not now. The 
i-'cIlought of brllak1nz It oQcuples 211ft) 90 muoh, :and at a.ll tImes, that 
~ t only b eco.rnes moPe nnd more firmly embedded. tt3 
This was S.K. t S r:1Hntal state at the ttme he was wtn~·ld.ng on 
, 
Sickness unto Death, a psvchological study of despair and freedom. ~__________ ._ J 
rt tssurpr1s1ng that h~.s Intonse self-introspection of this per10d 
,::o'_11d produoe such an impersonal, scientIfic treatise. Klerk.gaaN 
limself reoognized this charaotoristic ot his work, and aons1dex-ed ... 
1 t a. drawback. He would have .pref6I'l'ed t t to be rhat.ol'ical, at1 .. 
ring, and moving, as 1s suc;gested by the lyttlGal titl$w4 On the 
contra:l"Y, this treatment of lnvol vad ~4taleet5.oa is much mora rigi4 
than personal. 
To some extent, this aloofness of style can bo accounted for 
by the faot that 1:1 et-kegaard VIa:> gt vlng e .xpro s s ion to fa truth whioh 
ne f"el t transcended h1s own beln;~. He had not yet attained the 
freedom of spirit of which he was wrIt1ng; in his own eyes, he 
was not yet a true Chrtstiarh Consequently, when this work was 
JIbld., pp. 235·236. 
-4n)!~., Pp. 240 ... 241, 
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publist'l,'Jd one year" later. t10 a eded to his journal: 
Slclmess unto Death ap,:'HHlrs ~ but undor 3. pS8udo!1ym.. \it th me 
:~~j €lei.! tor:-It is :toscrtbsd ns f ['r)::.~ c'ilricnt~.cnt--t;:>xt 13 nore 
than my Clnte'!ory, the poet1.oal category. 'devotional t • 
Ltke the r~.v8r Guadnl::"iuivir ••• which Lt CDC pctut nlun-
::;e8 underground, so thore is a st!'etoh (the devottonal) whioh 
h,-·"";')'~ ..... ,- rln~1'" mf"~1'''''' '~n """l~~h,t,- 10'''''''''' (""'-.., ",(,e't> ".I.· c ) '\~.<. ....... .; <.f..J c.!;t) • ..t ... 1.':"J .... c ~.") ...... > ':' •. '-'u~.t~I..;.i. 't~/v.J... V~~I~ ... ~~ ... , ... ) d.t:·l" , 
v;111eh 1s pseudonymous, and somethinc higher, which also is 
:-)S~·Ctr1cm:!'''lf'·'S 1-\OCaU~3 ':':':"] ~10r;:; :mal i t~r .:'!OOB not c.)rPDS to 1 t. 
The pseudonym is called Johannes Antl-Cllmaeus in con-
tr'lst to Johe.n~:~'s Clir:lIV~'lS who sfd,~ .f) ~im;J n:)t a Ch~"'_',:::;~:lan. 
Ant1-Climaeu8 1s the opposi tEl extreme, b e1ng a Chl'ist1an in all 
O .".'· .... ryr''!''>'ii'''n,...~,. ,~"",·,y.r.>""_,,·,h"'...,t'~<'i·': T"""n" 'iO, nn)'~ ........... 'h.c" 'l"V{-r, f' simp·'" ch;i.;ti~~'~''; .. v c --" "'_',4,_q __ - ,J,o. '-', '-' -"-.1 L,'-' ." ,,'--" ~l. , .. 
Tho Sicknoss unto Death 
Siokness unto Death is divided into two parts. The first _ .............. ___ ~.J. 
lPart i.e entitled, "The Sickness unto Dea.th Is Despa.lrn; the second, 
"Despair Is Sin". This thesis concerns itself' mere properly with 
the first part, since it 1s hare that Klerkegaa.rd evolves dialeot1 .. 
oal fre0dom in a psyohological contoJtt,. lioreover, the second p9.rt 
" 
" is proporly theologioal, and involves concepts whioh transoend the 
limits of thls thesiS. 
The first part, "The Sickness unto Death Is Despair," 1s 
itself split into three seotions: (I) "That Despair Is Thts Sick ... 
hess'·; (II) "The Universality of' This Siokness"; (III) "The Forms 
of This Sickness, 1.e. of Despair". 
In this f1x-st ohapter c1' the thesiS, Wit W ill merely attempt 
to understand what K1erkegaard wrote in seotion If "That Despa1r 
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Is '1'h T. s Sicknes 8" It At fIrst hI ush, 1 t may ~lnpcar oj'! to in:l tiate 
if we out on the mind of Kierkec:aard. this becomes a locical polnt 
!of deoartllre. tlpreedom" is in no way an isolated term, but Im-
~ediately oonnotes a. pel"'son or Golf who ~osseSSGS freedo!n.. In 
fact, as we shall see later in this chapter, t he self is fpcedom. 
--
ponsequently, 1n order to appree .:.Ette dlaleotioal freedom, we must 
~irst understand the psyohologiee.l make .... up of the self, and that 
1s the purpose of this ohapter. 
Despair is a. sickness in the self, and in order to explain 
in section I the triple forlll V'!hlch this sickness may assume, 
!Kierkegaard 1s therefore cbllged to base his e xplanutlon on his 
psyohology of the self. So a study of this seotion oue~t to reward 
jus with a knowledge of man and his self. 
Despair Is a Sickness l~~~e Self 
What is mal? Man 1s sp:Lr1t.; and the spirit is the s~Jlf'. 
!Should we ask why this spirit is the:; elf', Kierkegaar:i would an ... 
we:r: Because the self is a relation which relates ltself to its 
I 
own self,o and that is a task proper to spirit. "The self 1s a. 
irelat10n wrlicb. relates 1 tsel! to 1 ts own self." In ord.er to under-
stand this statement 1n its t~tality, let us first seek the mean-
ing of lts parts. There are two relatIons involved 1n this defin1-
6S1eknesS unto Death, p_ 17. 
# 'Pi ............ ·• *4 
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tiOD or the self. TherA iR an ~r131nal relation Which, hy ~olatin 
A rolatton involves duality, and. 1s had only when two i'aeto:rs 
stand :tn relation to each other. Do we find such a relation when 
we observe man? :Man is not a simple unitJ in hi r.lsel i' he is a 
synthesis. Hats a synthesiS of the infinite and tne tinite, of 
the temporal and tho eternal, 01: fl~eedom and necessity.7 fIhs ultl 
mate constitution of man is relational. for man is a synthesis. 8 
7Ibid• 
-
t' 
uKierkegaard enumerates the elemem:;3 of tn1.s l:Iynthesis, but 
~(0S n0t bother to ~olldiry his enumeration wIth argument. In 
this we may 8,;6 an instance of' his contempt for the formal philo-
sonhy of his day. He neith0P considored hi~self to be u philosoph 
Dr winhflci others to think: of him as suoh. In truth, insofal~ as h 
l.1"ed t~;,e(~l(1cice.l ~.mrmos:'i tlonf1 ar~ P.. basi.s on wl'1ieh he develoned his 
thought. h,ts theology \\las much mor'a tihan s. negattve nOl"m. '1'0 that 
c~r.tr:nt., he '\7!.l.::l ~ f"l1"rcct to IlSAert thn t .h·t s worka embrace :mlch more 
than a philosophIcal category. 
rr~~ev(r, what 9.~. says ~Are R~nut th8 faotcrs 1n ~Bnts 
sY11.thesls may still he braoed with philosophc .. cal arp;urrl€mt. As irAn 
!~~: n.~ l"'C·~~~ te· t>10 lcn. '.v~ .. r1.r~.' of (}()~" i=i.S l~l:r 8 f'tnal (~.nuso, [\0 contains 
7ithin hirllself a possible posse~sion of the infinite. At the same 
':: 1 ,i:1.s c ·(~9t'.;r'('~o.'::1 1.9 11 eonst.:mt :ri:"mi:vle1" (;f' :1'\ g .fln,~.te natura. 
Si nee hoth these faotors plaY' an essential n art in man's being, 
th:~y "H',:,) '":,y na-r:.;J!"" .rel,nt;or! to fl"l':r;. (tfVH~ in ht~'1. Thus,. l:lan is a 
synthesis of the inflntte and the I':Lnite. 
A ~~urtrY;!' study of ~)~m T s na 1:'.11"0 'f1()venl s both t emnoral and 
t;~rnal aspeots. As a. ma.teria.l being, man is essentially com-
,Joslte, and -~,)t:t'or,,~ his nature is of itself oC;Y'l"untihle. This 
endows man with a temporal asp~:)ct since oOl-1ruption can only "cake 
)~.Qce thl"louGh mot:ton, and tirnA f.8:1orely the meliUmrc (:.1" motlon. 
On the other hand, m.an f.1.nds himself partioipating the eternal in 
that; h}.:z simnle 3."J.d indonendc::1t s'!tx·:tt Qfln -tn n) wav he cc'prupted. 
rrherefore. man 1n his spit-·tt is it!hl1ort&l. fl'ilib 1u why iU0l"'ksc;aard 
is able to say that man 1s a synthesis ot the temperal and eternal. 
A similar, but more involved. demonstration could be presente 
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~an 1s t~o or1Jlnal ~elation we ore neokln~ to un~e~9tand. Man has 
~cthin~ to ~ay a~out tht9 relation, for it derIv8S from th~ fact 
:)('dy, h.e is fint te and tempo:t:tol. In th' S 1"ela tlon, the reIn tion 1s 
lIhe thi:t:td term as a nee:ative unity, and the two relate themselves 
,,0 the relation, and in tho rola.tion to the 1'13] ation, 9 That Is, 
!nan, under the aspect of this '.r1ginnl synthesis, is neither body 
~or soul. but ia a thIrd term as a nc'!gat:tve unity. Body z.1nd soul 
roelete thems(;.lves to man, and they accomplish this relation in man. 
ilimself. The sarne may be said for anyone synthesis of the three 
nentioned above. For il1stance, freedom and neeeElslty relate them-
selves to man 1n man. and man ls n syntheslsbetween these two fae-
vors. Such a. synthesis 1.9 a negatIve On.lty, for althou[\h there 
:lxists a third term, there is no positive addition of being. In 
'I'E.'atl"n, man Is alr~Hldy bedy end soul, and althoueh he is neither 
",he onG nor the other, he can not ex! at wi tl1{"\ut the ccntemDoraneou8 
existenoe of eaoh. Therefore, this synthetio,. negatIve unity does 
lot C;iV0 man a further aspeot of being. Recarded us such, man· is 
p.ot yet a. se1f.10 A self is a r:'lation which relates Itself to it-
~eltj and so far we have considered only the orlr.;1nal relation. 
-
20 
but in creatiun he f'ln~is h:trl1~elf t:.) iJ6 f'inlte; ):lun can beoo:ne a 
~rGe man, but by an int tial nec·.jS $1 ty he is man. rIan looks at his 
~rlGinal synthesis and discovers that he DOSSesses finite, temporal 
and. neoessary a.spects. Becau.se he is finite, he is an imperfeot 
be.Lng. Yet" God has plaoed him in tine, and t here.fore hls fin! to. 
irrrperfect be in::;; is capable of cha.nge. !rhrough change. man oem 
Il-lirtlself' in l'Hedom.. 
'j}ilue 1s the period of beooming, and so it follows that in 
Cl:"eatlon God Q.0es not constitute a self', out aoelng whioh is to 
beeome itsel£., God doee not do the becomlng for man, at lea.st not 
k!irectly. lie merely synthes:tf;ea I'!lEln into existence with the n08-
slbillty of b Booming a selt'. Man is a being ordered and ca.pable 
Iof becoming his self. But what does ~thi8 becoming entail? How 
does man 0:0 aoout beooming hirnself? This is the prooess b:T which 
the lirir:inal synthesis relates l.tself to its mVr1 self, and this 
/').-/) ~ .,_",_,1 
l"elation is th.en the positive third term; this is thes elf. 11 
The original synthesis is a ccmposlte of' body and sc,ul, 
and it i 1:3 t he sp lri tual ns. tUI'(3 0 f the soul whi ch f:;i ve s r:lan th$ 
power to relate himself to his own salf. This sniritual power 1s 
itself a dialeotic of lntelleot and '.'till, both of which playa part 
in the aotivity bY' '11hichnan relates himself to his self. Sinoe 
the fulnesB of hil;) heinp: a.s Gc~d d,esires htm to he. Thls PO'lltH' is 
the IMtlr;inatton as it works tlu'ouE~h intellect, f'eeltn:e', and \'J:tll. la 
The :l.r:1u5"inatlon is the raoul ty i.ns'Gar omni'ttm. which tr~:ms:'.l1!'ently 
revef~l s to a man t h..e s,';,"nthest s r,f hIs b ein<~. lie sees himself <"is a 
un;f,.ty f'f time and eter-n'l ty, 1.n.t'ln1ty nnd ftn1.tude, f reedo!'l1 and 
neoessi.'ty. Klr:'l"kegaal"d calls this reflective aetlvity of the iJ1ag-
lnation the process of lnflnltizing man's selt,l) for it Is the 
reoognition of himselr Q¢oord1n~ t.o h1s infinite possibilities. 
Note that this 1s not merely recognition of possibilities, but 
rather reoognition of self aooording to possIbIlity.. Imac~ination 
onables man to see himself as a flnt,ta boinF: just as r:mch a.s in-
finite. He objeottvely- sees and approotatea himself as God ronde 
htm. Until a man ?OSS93See this obj8:~tlve knowledge of his origin" 
a1 synthesis, he oannot hone to rela ..te'· correctly this synthesis to 
his own self. Obtaining this knowledr,e is t he .first step in the 
d:i.alontieal process whereby a relation relates ttself to its own 
sel.f, and this 8tep is called :tnrinlt'!.7.a.tlon.lL~ 
l2Ibid •• pp. 1~S-46. Ti1e importanoe of t;':e i'tla!:::;inatlon t s 
relation to these t hrce DOV'leI'!J will be tr0atcCl. :in the f'011ov:!..-;r> 
chapter when we consldert he despair of tnfinitude. 
l3Ibld., D. 46. 
-
14"Itif1nitlzattontt i8 an important notion for S .. K. Its 
ne;~ative implioations will be noted in the following chapter under 
the despairs of 1.nfinitude and finitude; its positIve values will 
take un the whole of chanter III. 
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The second step by which a :::-elation relates itself to its 
c,wn Gell is the aetnal reI!:' t.iIn2, or' th.e relEt t;lon, [:$ a third term. 
in actualization. If the first step was called "lnflnitizatlon," 
£md WHS ;,.;110 third term in the dlalecti.c of infix;. i tude and fini-
tude, we may call this second ~3tep lI ac tualization, ft and it 1s the 
t;hil~ll. tdrI4 in the dialect:tc of possibility and necessity.l; This 
rei acion is the posl ti va third. 'cerm when the relation relates i t-
self 'co i t<3alf. and this pos1t:t va third term is the "elf .16 The 
self :1 s 1'reedom.17 By becoming himself, man mcomes rl'tee. Let U8 
examine more carefully, for til moment, this dialectic between PQS-
slbillt;r and necessity • 
.ell though m.un understi.,nds hls being tnl"ough lurin1 tlzs.tlon, 
he is nf.)t pure snirit,. and oonsequently his ex.istence is not one 
of pure 1iuaf;.ina,tlve refleoti.on. As man, he is physically acttve. 
and it. i3throup,h action tnat he strives to realize the infinite 
possibilitle3 reflected in his imugiru{tion. Commonly undorstood. 
tnis is the drive in man to attain his ideals, and for Kierkegaard. 
this \!'Juuld refer Oflrtloularly to spirt tuaJ. ideals. Here vie ha.ve 
'G1.i.f.) counterpart to lnfini tizinr';. By nn 1nfint te l"etum to himself, 
man aotualizes his pOHsibl1ity 1n nEHHH.lSity.1G To a lim~.ted degree. 
1's:Ib1d. , 
-
p. l~3t 
l:)Ibld., 
-
p. lB. 
171bid 
• J •• p. 43-
18~., p. 21. 
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he beoomes his ideal. Thus throu~~ the double dialeotio ot in-
finitude/finitude and possibility/neoessity, man beoomes himself. 
This is treedom. The aelf is freedom, 
The essential note of thlS ent;re process is that .man freea 
himself. God makes man tree insofar as He enables him to beoome 
tree by endowing him with a nature possessing imaginative pos-
sibility, and the will to ehoose the aotualization of this pos~ 
slbllity. God oonstitutes the original synthesis or relation ot 
infinity and finitude, but it is the ma.n himsolf who relates this 
relation to its self by finitely aotualizing the IDrlnlte possi-
bility whioh he imagines. He understands his infinite p09sible 
self, and relates his God-given synthesis to that possibility 
throuf~ his own aativity. This dialeotioal element between possi-
bIlIty and necessity 1s called "aotualizatlon".19 It 1s freedom. 
It is that in the relation whloh rel&.tes itsolf to ita own self • 
. ,
There 1s a tinal aspeot to the t rhe self Which we have not 
yet considered, and we must do so now, for it is perhaps the most 
important element In Kierkegaardfs understanding of freedom. A 
relation Which relates itselt to its own self must either have 
oonstituted itself or have been constitu.ted by another. 20 That is, 
either the origina.l synthesis 1s responsible for its own unity, or 
else it 1s dependent for this unity on the power of another. 
19"Aetualization" will be treated negatively 1n ohapter II 
under the despairs of possibilIty and neoesslty; its positive 
values embraoe ohapter IV. 
20~ .. nlrnAC<Ul nn+:n n~u,t:h n 1 R 
ltierkegaard goes on to state that if the originul synthesis is oon-
st:1 tuted by another, then its relat 10n to i taelf 1.:1S a third term is 
in turn a relation relating itself to that whioh oonstituted the 
whole relation. 21 Let us not be sidetraoked or confused b ythis 
abstI'Qot formulation in our effort to discover S .. K. t s meaning here. 
As we have already seen, fllan t s crit;inal synthesis is a. union 
of body and soul. For many obvious reasons, 'We know that man 
does not create this synthesis 1n himself by his own powex-. He 
is brought into existence by another, and that Mother" is respon-
sible for rnan t s oomposite nature. The synthes1s 113 oonstituted by 
God, and this tact effeots important oonsequences as man lives his 
way into freedom. 
Freedom is achieved through the dialeotios of infinitiza-
tion and aotualization. Once man has understood the truth of what 
he i8 (lnf'initizatlon), he can prooe~dto visualize his true pos-
sibilities, and then actualize this possibility by bringing it into 
!neoessity (actualization). A man does this by imaginatively pro .... 
jecting his self into an ideal state, and then striv1ng in a con-
orete manner to actualize this Ideal. It man had constituted his 
orig1nal synthesis by his own power, there would be no more than 
ithis to the becoming of fl"eedom. But God t s power 1s the oonstitu-
tive power', and with this 1s added another dimension to freedom. 
Freedom 1s the third, positive term hetween the terms body 
25 
and sOlll, and the idealized self. Freedom is aotualized oosslbll1 .. 
ty. In itself, it 1s related to tile terms .. vhich compose it. 
But Kierkegaard states further tllat since the original relation 
is derived from God, freedom, or the solt, is there.fcro 1 tsolf a 
relution which x-alates i taolt to God. "The self cannot of i taol!' 
attain and remain in equilibrium and rest by itself, but only by 
relating itself to that POWOl" whioh oonstituted the whole relation, 
The free man stands in oonsoious relatJonship to God, seeing hi~ 
self as a being derived from. God and oorrunanded to approach God in 
freedom. It 1s only by doing So· that man can beoome free. 
ThiS," then, is the rOl"mula Which adequa.tely d ascribes the 
condition of the free selt: by relating ltself to its own self, 
and by willing to be i tsel!', the self i s;r"0unded transparently in 
the Power whioh posIted it. 23 
Before moving on to the l">elatio.n betWeen .freedom and despair, 
" 
it may be protltlble to give a final cSlal'lticatlon to theso basic 
notions of Kierkegaal"d' S dlaleot~.ea.l freedom. This fx-eedom of 
Which we ha.ve been speaking is totally d ifterent tx-om the ordinary 
meaning of the term "treedom". Obviously.. we have not been con-
cerned here with treedom of choice, the ability to dotl';)rn1ine our 
O\'1n OOUl"se of action. D:Lalectical freedom is muoh more deeply 
rooted in ('!lan's essential make-up. In his Journals, Klerke[!;aard 
22Ibid. 
-
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deplores the fact that ;;';0 many people tu'e bl inded by their own 
amorous obsession with freedom of choice: 
'1'he inconoeivable marvel of the oll1nipotenoe cf love 1s that 
God can really e;rant so muoh to man, that almost like a lover 
he cum say of himself: 'will you have me or nl t,' and so wait 
one seoond for the answer. 
But alas,. man is not $0 purely spirit. It seGms to him 
that since Ute choice is left to him he oan take time and 
first of all think the matter over sel~1oual;z:. What a miser .... 
ab!e-a.'I1tl-cilmax. tSeriousness' sirnp1y c'ieans to choose God 
at once and t first' • In that way man is left Jugglin2; with 
a phantom: freedom of choice--wlth the questIon whether he 
does or does not possess it. etc. And it even becomes soien-
tific, He does not notice that he has thus suffered the loss 
of his fI*eedom. For a time perhaps he delights·in the thought 
of freedom until it cha~;es again, and he loses his f~eedom 
of choice. He confuses everrythlng by his faulty taottcs. By 
dil"eotin~; his mind towards , fl.'oedom of choice' instead ot 
choosing he loses both :freedom and !'~eedom of choice. Nor call 
he ever reoover it by the llse of' thought alone. If he 1s to 
~ecover his freedom it oan only be through an intensified t:fea 
and_trembling' brought forth by the thoup;ht of havine lost 
it.~ 
For our present purpose, let us draw two major thoughts from the 
above passage. The f Lrat is that Kittrkegaard clearly distinguishes 
., 
hel,'le between freedom and freedom of ehbloe. "By dIrecting his mind 
toward 'freedom of ch.oice' instead of choosing he loses both free-
dom and freedom of choIce." The second important notion is that 
freedom. can only be attained ttw~·U.f,h choice, and in particular, it 
Imust ultlrnatuly be the choioe of God. 
Dialectical freedom may therei'ore be described 1n the 1"01-
lowing manner. Man 1s created as a very imperfect being, but be-
cause of the g1ft of time, he is able graduully to perfeat himself. 
I""" 
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?,owever. man's perfection does not consist ~.n any haphazard devel-
~),)rl:'3nt of his .racul ties. Mao'l' s final cnd is his possession of Ood 
in the B.:atific Vision. Therefore, he must use his faoultios in 
such a way as to attain this hoal. Whatever nctton leads him to 
God is i?;ood; whatever withdra.ws him .f:rom his purpose is ovil. By 
examining himself, man first C(~·me8 to a kno:'Vled(~e of what he trulY' 
Is, and then gains an understanding of what he iz.; able to be: a nuu: 
of good life, standing before God in faith, hope, and love. This 
1s his ideal selt, the self he must achieve. His perfection is th. 
good lite; the good life grows out of good deeds; good deeds, 1n 
turn, are grounded in choice, not in the possibility of choice but 
in actual choosing. Moreover, first and last, man must choose God. 
This iahia perfection, and as man slowly and arduously becomes 
more perfeot. he sheds his imperfeotion and limitation. He frees 
himself from whatever hinders his progress toward God. He wins 
" freedom as he wins his self. BY' becoming his self, he becomes 
freedom. This 1s mants freedom; Kierkegaard's dialectical freedom. 
Freedom and Despair 
So tal- we have dIscussed hOlY man gains freedom by becoming 
himself. He achieves this ncri'oction throu€!)l a dialectio. of 
right relation. Right relationl This is tho prec;se momont of 
crisis, Each relation of this labyrinthean dialoctio must be con-
strued according to right relation. Only then will the result be 
freedom. Should any dlsrelatlonshlp seep into this dialectic, thel 
28 
!man ralls into despair, for despair 1$ the dlsrelationship in a 
relation which relates 1.tse1i' to itselr. 25 
God so oreated man that he assumes r'esponslbllity for 
fhiS own freedom. This Lift of God to man 5 the loftiness of beine 
spirit. It 1s a. gift that only God oan give. From. finite power 
comes only ~pendenceJ and omnipotenoe ulono oan r:UJ.ko Gomethlnf 
independent. Only Ood can create something out of nothing which 
can endure of itself, because only Go<.1 can take Himself back in'" 
iflnltely from Hlsg1ft. 26 Tho glury of man is his independence and 
Ibis ability of uSing this power to aohieve frreedom before God • 
. Man, however, is finite. So, in the molding of his dialeo-
tioal freedom, there 1s the :)osslbl1Ity of disrelatlon. Man is 
liable to despair. S.K. points out that this is a unique sltuatlon~ 
~he very possibility of despair is an infinite advantage to man, 
~or it i8 indicative of his splrItua.~ nature. Were he not spirIt, 
pe could not despair, Therefore, the possibility of this sickness, 
~espair~ 1s mants advantage over the beast. 27 Ordinarily, it the 
possibIlity ot a thing is an a dvantage, its aetu.allty ts even mo:re 
so. POI' Instunce, such 1s the case with freedom, Not so wi t.h des-
pair. The aotuality of despair 18 n18.nt s greatest l:l:sfortune. "In-
ifinite as is the advantage of the pODs:1.b111ty, just so Great is the 
25SIolmess unto Death, P. 21. 
--------. ---- -----
26The Journals, p. 180. 
-
27S1ckness unto Death, p. 20, 
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noasure of the fall. u28 To avoid this fall into the actuality of 
~espair, a man must every moment annihilate tho posstbl11ty of 
-'tespalr.29 The actualIty of freedom is attained only w hen at eaoh 
~nstant the possibilIty of despair is negated. 
Not despair itself,30 but only tho possIbIlity of despair 
~s inherent in the Iluture of mEln. In (Jrder fol' thEn."e to be d cspaira 
~nherent in man, a necessary dlsrelationship W ouldHive to exist in 
",he original syntheSis as it is derived from God. But man would 
not then be responsible for bis freedom, since he is not responsl-
ble for the constitution of his own nature. If such W Ol"E; the case, 
:lespair Hwould be sow.eth:ing that befell El man, sometb.ing he suffeJ:1'e~ 
paSSively, like un illness into which a man falls, or like death 
Lrvhlch is the lot of al1. 1131 B.1'\.. states that this ts not tC1E;) case •. 
~an, because of the nature of his derived synthesis, Is a self-
perfecting a gent. If he f'&11s into d.spalr, the:cefcre, he himself 
-, 
,-
H1S made an eventual 1 ty what was ruer'ely possible in him, 
Despair is an 111ness, but unlike ether Illnesses, it is 
at contracted at a moment wi ttl the eo ntinuanoe of the disease as 
~ Simple oonsequence of the fact that it had onoe baen ccmtraoted. 
lOIbld. (Lowrie1s translaticn reads: "No, this thin; of des-
palring-r.s-lnherent in man ••• , tt but aooordlng to context, I be-
ieve that S.K. must have meant to sa~ rather: UNo, this thinE: of ~espairlng 1s LPoSfinherent 1n man ••• ) 
31Ib1d• 
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Kiorkegaard oxplain.s that every instant a man is in J08:)a11'"', ho is 
contractin:?; despalr. 32 His l"eason is t!.lat despair is not an efrec 
,)'f the d1sl"elationshlp; ra'ther, it is the dlsrelatlon it301f. But 
the disrelatlon results from the manner in which the r'elation re-
latea itself to 1 to?! own solf. Sinoe a man can 1.10 mol'S avoid the 
,'C'ala tlon to hi s self than he oan avoid hlmself (which is the same 
thing), it follows that 110 Is continually choosing his disrelation .. 
ship, and therefol"e continually contract:tng despail'>. 
Despair 1s the sickness unto death, and, as S.K. des0ribes 
this stOkness,J) death is in this instance, an eternal death. Deatl 
is not the last, but it 1s G'Cmtinllally the last; the last state 
continues into eternity. Whethe!* :nan ,lS in despair by not willing 
to be himself or by willing to be h1m.solf (1.e. othe~ than his trw 
self), he canrlot tear hIs self away trom the po\ver '.'1hlch constl tu-
t.ad i t,34 The self must st1..Ll'ld etez-nally before God, and the final 
d~Bpalr of the self 1s the despair at 'net be lng tibIa to C onSU,nEl it. 
selt. The torlnent and death oonstst preoisely in not be::'lLC; able tc 
die.35 "To have a self, to be a self, 1s the grea.test conoe.sion 
m.a1.e to man, but at the same time it is eternity's da:und Ul)on hlm~1t 
32rbld., 
-
p. 23. 
3Jlbld. , 
-
PP. 24-31. 
34Ibid., 
-
lh 29. 
35Ibtd • , 
-
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36Ib :td. , 
-
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Summary 
In this oha,tsr we have a ttealpt~d to open up to our under-
standln<;: tlB deeper notions of Kll';l'l"kegaard t s dialeotioal freedom. 
Since ~).K. identifies freedom wi. th the self. we b?/::an by seeking 
a k..1').()wledc,e of Kierke?:aardian psychology. What is ~1.e.n S:l::1'::ha t 
is hIs self? ~Ve f:..~und thIs tmswer in S.K .. t s treat:nent of t .. ,C 
natura of despair, for despair is a disproDortlon in the 3clf. To 
explain the forms of despair, Kierkog!lard devcloood a ps:.:cholop:y. 
He wrote that man is a relation w'1lch l":;lates 1 tself to 1. tsolf., 
'lnd this l"alation which 13 a third term as a posit!v,:; un:1.ty is the 
self. This is freedom. ;,~an achievns thl.s fre(}d':ln1 throu[:-h a rioub14 
dialectio of lnfin1.t1.zatlon end actualization. S.K.ts fel'Illula for 
the free self is this I by 1"61a tin;; 1 tsalf to ~ ts ol;vn ~H~lf, and by 
willing to be i tsalf, the solf 13~roundad transparently in t:1B 
Power whioh posited it. 'Ne saw th.lit ~ thls;.3 not the -:;0'.'1101"> ,f free 
caoico, but freedom 1s !!'lan insofar as 'he b3comos pel"foct, thus 
freel:ng himself from the 1 iroi tations of L1p(:':ri'ectlon. 
The final section of this chapter revealad the relation 
b8tween freedom and despatr. If freed{)lU is the correctly c:::n~ti­
tuted self, despair is the disrelationshlp in a relation whIch 
relates :1 tsel.f to t tself. Man is responsible for his own freedom, 
a.."1d therefure is the sc)uroe of his ownJ.espair. uospal:r> in ma"1 l s 
great0st mi~.li"or1;u.net and although it is not inherent in his na.ture 
if he should die in despair, his despalr wIll be eternal. 
Since a c::':l'trect understandin!J; 01"" despair is obviously il11por-
tl.ttcnt.ion new to t::.1'3 dlffc:rent forms of Jespatr, thts !:ilolrness 
unto:lauth. 'l'hen we fftll be In ;:l, better pc)sitlon to analyze tho 
dialectios of !nflnltlzatlon and ~ctuallzatlon. 
CHAPTER II 
The study of philosophy and personal experience beth show 
that we often do not adequately value a truth until we c(cme face 
to face with Its contrary. We best apprec:tate life in the con-
frontation of dea.th, goodness i.1.ssumes a hlf~her value when Vi e ex-
perienoe evil. To a great extent, the same is trll,e o.f dialectioal 
freedom. A deeper knowledge of despa1I', the contrary of freedom, 
ought to enrich our evaluation of the actualized self. The purpose 
01' this chapter 1. s to probe despair wi th a study of 1 ts various 
forms. and thereby in a negatIve way we will appronoh Kierkegaardta 
dialectical freedom. 
As freedom is a dialectical aOhieyement 1n a man's liore, so 
despair is a dialectical failure in life. Both are movements in 
lIfe. Both are existential:tstio movements. In order to place the 
movement of despair (or or freedom) in an existential context, let 
us first examine rnan. s lIfe prior to this movement. 
The Prelude to Despair 
Life, according to S.K., is divided into three stages: the 
aesthet':"cal, eth1cal, and reliDious •. A'llan cannot cross the gap 
if'rom the aesthetieal to the ethio.l wI thou~t -leaping into the dia-
l 
,~ , 
leotlcs of freedom. Since despair 1s the contrary of freedom, 
th:ts Itprelude to despair" ,,1111 5i:71ply be a Joscrls>tlon of the 
aesthete before the ethical life first man:rBsts Itsolf to him. 
Until the aesthete bocom.es consctous t:1at un ethical l1fa 
is possible for hi~. he hus enjoyed a hedonistic pleasure-lIfe. 
He haa baen unconscious of the factors of 'luty an:! respons"lbil1ty 
in life, and consequently he 9 never determine::! hiu..:vm Clct'~ons 
fr'om wi thin himself. On the contrary, his only ;,lOtlvutln:"; fOl'CEl 
in life has been th:rt beaut:tful and pleasurable which 1io outsl:le 
him., waiting to be drawn wlthin. This man, says i.acrk:3~·~aa;.Yl, has 
missed the point of Ilfe. He is self-deceived, be11evinc that he 
has oonquered what he has not even faced. "In b"s fools conceit 
:t t is hidden from him how distressing his 1 :U's is. ,,1 'l'he tragedy 
11es preoisely 1n the aosthete's unawareness that he 5. s slowly 
soveI'ln:: himself from eterna.l sal va tlon, and becau210 he .t s unaware 
of his s1 t'J.a.tion, he cannot SOrrO?l ova"!' it. IUs cond;. tion may be 
likened to a man stricken w 1 th u deadly cancerous r;rowth who 1"6-
fuses to acknowledge that he Is sick untc) del1th. Only t he fact 
of death :!tself forces him to a.dmit his canoerous co:::-rui!tlon, and 
then he must not only acknowledge t:-.lat he 'II ~3 S lck, hut that noW' 
he is dead. What did hO'aln by l\V~: idln; tho inconvenienc() of 
doetortng? Spealdn:~~ of thts, K1er'kegtHU'd ~'jr~.tos, "That ':.1.0 has 
ceased to sorrow,' we shall not:'.!eny. Hut \4;Hi.t a.:lvantD.~:e 1.s t1'1:i.3 
lS;6r:m K1erkei;~l1ard, Works of L,ove, tr. David F. and IJll11a.n 
Marvin Swenson {Princeton, 1946"-; p. 5'. 
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to him whon his ohance of salvat:ton 11es in his beginning in 
earnest to ao:t-row over himselfl,,2 Stt'letly s p,sak1ng, suoh A. man 
has not lost his freodom, because he never realll possessed f'1!ee-
do~. Liko all men, he holds in his power the possib111 ty of beeo. 
ing tree, but this he d1acaPdes by-remaining an aesthete, 
However, it is impossible to traverse l1fe t'tally" un-
consoious .of the higher ~.Jalues, At sorns time or othor. the othlca~ 
sphel1emani.testa 1 taalf to tho aesthete. !4an t s essential nature 
as spIrit [lakes th13 manifestution a nocessity. As s'r.;irit, he 12 
able to understand hImself us a· crea.ture destined for a higher GOO( 
than aesthetieal pleanur-e. "There com.es a moment in a man's life 
when hi s im.>nedlao1 ia, as 1 t ;WGN, ~lp()ned and the spll'i t demands 
a. hlghGl" :i'Ol"m In whioh it w:t11 approhend itself HS sptrit. n3 We 
ml;Jht say that this is man's natUl"e oalling upon him to expreas 
him.self as subjoetand no longer as ~~jeet. Trmt is, be is not a 
mere .. passive obJeot as the lrl'atlonal" o.re .. ttures around him. As 
subJeot, he must be the sc;urce or his own sal.f-deternlinatlon, rath-! 
al" than a reolplant, passively datermined by pleasurable obJeot. 
around him. IUs essentIal dignity demands recognition.; his person 
assumes the l"lsht of selt-determination and will no longer meekl,. 
acoept subordination to a lifa ot hedoniwn. 
,. .. I I .. I I. 
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JSpren Klerkegaard, E1ther/Or~ A Fra~ent ot tite, tl". David 
F •. Swenson and Lillian Marvrn !wenson-ti?l'lnoeton;-l~, It p_ 1!)9. 
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This psychological state initiates the first erlais in man's 
existence. What does he experience when the sptrlt in him fights 
thus for supremaoy? His first reaotion 1s an.attempt to unite 
his eternity cf spirit or which he is now conscious. with the 
aesthetioal life to which he has become so attached. Thus, he 
begins to long ro!' an eternal grasp of the im..'11ediate satisfaction, 
but the immediaoy ot material pleasUre 1s t~ansitor1 and oon-
rel~ra.tlve, whereas ooly the ,.,el'durance of spirit oan be gl'asped 
eteJ.'lnally_ 
This is the experienoe of the man steeped in aesthetics. 
As.tn and again he is fl"U~tr'ated by the emptiness of his .:amse 
pleasures. His grasp, at them. only clutches an e-phemeral vanol' 
that will not prolong ita stay. He is unftble to :Np~odllce a lost 
moment, and what was onoe a boyish pleEl.5tlN-lito becomes a .::taooat~ 
aer1es of sense sattstaQtlons threadEtt:ltogether by perIods of f'ru8. 
tI'at1on. The spll"l t in man Is cQllinef fOlJi a sel.r ... emanc1pa tlon,anc 
it this movement 1s periodically chocked and forced back., a melan-
chollcatmosphepe settles over the aesthete" Metaphor~oally, mela." 
ehol,. 1.8 tq.e spiritual nel'VOUI syatem in man that reports the fi.:N,i 
syrap'oma ot a disorder, dl&propol'tion, or sioimess in his 'being. 
It does not reveal the nature of the sicknes$, but ~rell indioate. 
tha t something 1. wrong.4 As pain l'8qui1."es a doctol" S exanlinat10n 
to d1scover 1ta oause, $0 m.elancholy demands selt-introspeotion br 
4Ih1d.. 
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the afflicted sUbJeot",5 Actually, melancholy 1s oaused by tho 
fl:"ustrat1on 1n a spirit wh~.ch had bo.;.;n c;l"eated to become itself 
in freedom. When this natural drive is contlnclally thw<::rted by 
the obstacles of aesthetic PEU1:-d.o!'l, ~oll:ineholy 13 the outcome. 
';'J:lethor at this pOint a JUan Is acutely conscious ,yf .t t (.1" n:.,t, 
this is the first cloudy but definite kn iY;\lledge :1<:: has ~)f his real 
self.. Melanoholy tru11 tells a man that his destiny extends be-
yond the aesthetic oateScry. If tlle m.an rGfuses t,:' acknowledge 
his melanoholy and str:tven to regain his unperturbed tlosthet.to 
state, then lJ1$lanoholy itself becomes despair, It is the despair 
) 
ot oo.st1ng aside the possl'bil1ty of freed.om, of r3fuBing to become 
hImself. On the other han:i, it the matl is willIng to adm! t to 
hI¥'nself his melancbolic state,·· his s:olmess unto denth. he has 
taken the:'lrst step on the path t,-ward freed;; In, for he has bogun 
the d.lalectlc of Infinitiaatlon. At~t;hls point,. man stands, ao it 
were, before God on the threshold ot beoom,,~~ln$' He 1s e aIled to 
freedom, and 18 liable to Q$spab.... ~1e will eonsido:r nOVJ the pos .... 
sible forms ot dospa.lr. 
"The form.s ot despair, tt wl"ites K1erkegao.rd, "must be dis-
coverable abstraotly b y rotleet1ng upon th4 factors whioh oompose 
50n this point, James Col11ns writes:: ftThe only Bort ot 
retleot1on which be ~lerkegaars7de.med capable of removing tht • 
• tate 'Of untreedom is moral and religious reflection, for it is 
only through this agenoy that a man oan relate himself' freely to 
Q transoendl!tntnlr>rlnciple of existenoe." James Collins, !!!! 7.t1nd 
.2.£. 1\1erkee: .. ard (Ch.icago, 1953). p. 59. 
the self as st synt.~~lesls."6 ranee tho s elf beC(.~'f19S .~ tself through 
t::e double dia.leotic cf infini tude/flni tude and pcssibil1 ty/ 
nocessity, there will be t~o Dalrs of poo3ible despairs. 
Despair Viewed undar the Aspects ot 
FinItude/InfinItude 
A man becomes himself hy char: glnt:: himself. Only his c'vm 
personal choice can make him fre3. T!1:!'S choice ts porsonal in a 
twofold manner lnsofar as man 1s both the nr:,ent a.nd object of this 
choice. But a man cannot choose h:t~(\self unl~3s he r.':?6vlotlsly 
knows what his self Is. In ;~,rder to come to thls lmowlod(;c, he 
:llust ::;0 throuGh the dialeotic of rini tude/lnflnittlde. He l'r:UBt 
understand his criginal synthosts in cO:;:'I'e~t proportion as itt s 
dari ved from Ood. To lack aVU:.lj."'oness of finl tl;tde Is to fall into 
the despair of' inrini tude. On the othQr hand, shouJ.d a man mis-
understand his inflnitude, .he falls prey t;) the 1espul~ of tint ... 
tude. Let us examine the f'or'i1e:" despair tlrst. 
Kierkegaard tells us that the (lespair of Infinlt':;\de 1s duo 
to the lack of flnitude.7 Any human existo"lce tha.t :tde(l.11zas 
:1 tsolt as s..'lefJr inrini ty is by that very fact in despair, or or the 
faetual eloment of finitude in man tUl"!1S the imar:;ination of his 
pure infinity into an absurdity. For ~an to i~a/lne himself as t~ 
~ J 
'Sic:lmess unto Death, p. L{.3. 
-- ~ .. 
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infinite is ";',11.'.: lililitj it is fan.tastical. 8 
Th0 sheer infInity of' ,:on is fanta~itieal, an·:: 8.2\. says a 
f'Sl1:.tasy is most closely l"olatoc! to imaClnattcn. In -'1. tn turn, 
a ;'.1(1.n may have a fC~lta:~t1eal foeline, or lmC't't'ledg€, or will. The 
tempcn" of a per~on'.9 .feo11n~1 :cv;wledge, 01" 'Nill in tho last resort 
315 is reflocte:.: in tr.e :-drror of Ina£.:lr;ation, Ctnd th.t:::: :::'ofloctlon 
13 t11eself, or the [..os31b10 self. Ir:v:1G1nDtlon 1s the reflection 
of tho Pl"CCOSS of lnfin1 tl~ation. The:C'of(:'1"~;, Iael"l~o£;aal'>d V'H':t tes, 
tl1J~h€) self' 1s reflection, D.nd li;lii[;tnat1on 1s reflect:i.oD, it 1.3 the 
coUt.'1terf'e1t presontment of tho;J elf', which is the poss:i.billty of 
the s olf'. ,,10 The ttCounterfel t presentmf;nt" is not the actualized 
~lelr, bnt [ler-ely the possible self as uirrorod in ImaL~ina.tion. 
~acce ima[inatlon li'.'orks through feeli·nc;, kncwled~:o, C'J.!"d v;111, the 
" 
" Idespair of Infini t1.;:.de ;:1S.y ta.ke the fantast ieal form of anyone of 
ithoao three. 
A fantastic fsollnE vclatilizes the self. It ~)8CS7tF;}S an 
~b~ltract sentimentnll ty "which 1s no In~j,UID..a.n that it doc:J r:.~t apply 
~o any person, but lnhurn.a.rily participates reolinel;,. :':'10 to speak, 
~n the fate of one or anotlK:l" abstraction., e.g. tllat of nunl:ind !!! 
ItO 
ab~tra9.tg.ttll Thls·form'ot despall' wag not unknown durIng S.K.I. 
own lltetime. On. the ro ntlnent and in England, it was expressed 
inlltaraturo by men who ident1fied themselves. with natura. Such 
was Wox-ds\V()rth. His counterparts in AI!let"1o~ weNl known as the 
transoendentalists who lost themselves in a world soul. ZUch was 
·the poet Emerson. Throughg~neral1ZEtd sentimentalIty, m.an ether ... 
aliled himJhtlt ,and by s o~bln!3' he 'lost him.self in fanta.tic 
feeling. 
Pf.U1ts..atio knowledgfl is another fOl'm·ot the desptlir of in-
finItude. Xlerkeg&l1rd claims that an Intelleotual progression 
in any field ought to be!,ul"allaled by an Inol"eas1ng s elr ... lmowl· . 
edge. The more the selt knows. the more it should know i~Belr.12 
It this :parallel 18 broken. thit person has s<tuand3r~d his knowl .... 
edge._ IUa Intellectaal powaI's run allay from him, and fantastioal. 
lY' take himselt out of himself .. Th.e~lnt.lleetual rune the r1sk 
ot becoming ena..IY1oured, ot hls unpa:r.-alleled sp1r1 tual powers. and 0' 
no lonser ••• 1ng b.lm.selt as a sInner who II'lUst stand humbly betor. 
the eye- of God. ne runs the rIsk of despalI". 
The w111 a180 .an beeo..llS fantastic. When 1 t does so, the 
person wl11a the impossible for hlmsolt; he wl11s rantastic infini. 
ty.l) By .veatr1ctlng his w~ll to the impossible, he outs himself 
llIp,1~· 
12Ib&4., t -p., 41. 
l.3~b1.q. 
oft from the possible. whIch Is hlnlself. That is. he cuts hlmaeltt 
ott trom himself. By rrtllk1nG it impossIble to. b!eome hImself, tht. 
man makes lt necessary to fall into deal's.!%'. He stando ln the 
pr$sent moment just as close to the impossible as he Is to the 
poa.tblllJ that is, Intln:!.toly distant trom althoI'. 
As teeling. knowledge, or wl11 becomes tantastio, 80 too 
does the selt,and always With moral responsibl11-f;j,14 For the 
self as s~lrlt Is responsible for tho correot proportions withIn 
hi8 bGlng. 'l'b.e fantastic selt tlies runher and further aws.y f%'OJI 
Ittu)lt\.Its relationshIp to' God becomes a t.t1ntast10 abstl.rcUt,.. 
S.K. puts these woX'ds into the mou.th ot such a rnwu "That a spar-
row can live .18 eomprehens1.b1e, 1. t does not know anything about 
existing betore (Jod. But to Imow that one exists 'bef"ore God--and 
then .nct to go ora~y or be "brought to nau{")lt&,,15 On the other 
hand,' it 1s possIble tor It man so to ~lQse himself" and net reall,-
notioe the d1.ftertH'lc." He may lIve a ""nornal" life in sooiety. ant 
never let on that he Is ~e1t ... less. Any other loss, nn arm, a wlt~ 
five dollars" Is su~to be noticodl but not the loss ot selr.16 
Tragedy and p&radoxt 
The s$ocnd form of despair ~. ~ that of fin! tude, a"1d is due to 
1*'<. J 
14Ib1!-., p, 48. 
lJctbid., pp. 48-49. 
16Ib1d .•• p. 49. 
-
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the laok of 1ntIn1tude.11 Narrow .... m1n't!edness and r.IOt1.nneas of Itp1rU 
Core the two eharaotsrlstlos of this despair, not in the sense in 
which they are usually u..."l.d(l:"'stood, but 1n an ethical sBnsc.1B fils.. 
man hns naI'l"'Owed his'mind. and theNby bemeaned his spirt t. He 
looks at his universe with colored glasses whioh filter out the 
real! ties ct the spir1 t. and allow him to see merely the l'Jorldly, 
soola1 lite about him. This universe is crtqnpled into a. crowd, 
and he now fita into his universe by fitting into the cro"l/d. His 
aotions aredeterm.ined by ·the conventions ,,1.' sooiety, and he 1s 
content to .alfUlsu.re out his life in eottee spoons. In this wrry. 
he. loses blm.selt'. tor hetinds It too dangerous and ventul"'eeon.te 
to become him.sel.f. How much motte e::uy to become f1.n 1m! tation ot 
ot!lel"s, to become a nll.mber. &. oipher in the crowd. 
NatursJ'1y, this torm of despaIr l.sneverne;tlced by the world. 
f'or 1 t 1s Ii fltl!,ng Into the world. !l'h~re 1s no contr~st between 
:t" . 
self andsoc1et1. and where there is noth1nr: to be notioed, itts 
~reol sel,. nothing that w111 bo notloed.19 Therefore, the world w11 ~ 
~ever understand thle to be despair, for 1 t reoo~snizes despair 111 
tanxiety. and where there 1s nothing ... there can be no anx.:tety.20 
lSIb~d., p •. 50 •. 
19Ibld ... P. 51. 
-
2ONo doubt this toPa ot despaIr wl11 be prevalent in an,. age; 
land oet-ta1nlr 1t mal be predicated ve"y properly o~ modet"n man. 
"The post-modem as-" hes beoOB a veX-led in wbleh men devote 
• 
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This despair isa loss of selt in. society, and to that exten' 
it 1s a failure to become the solf. It raqu1:-9s D. vont':J:1"esor:1e 
r;plrl t to overcomo the attraction of th1s clespa.!.r when In the r~ld.1' 
of asooll!ty whoso 1";16. jor concerns are t o;:1poral and f1ni to. To b .. 
come a self. 1s a vonture,'!:lnd yet the social md.nd says that 
shrewdness 113 not to ~lenturc, bocause one inay lose. Tho ::loll' .. 
minde,i man :t'lfHtSOns differently, saying:. "'By not venturing, It 1s 
so dreadfully easy to lose that which 1. t would be diffie'ill t. to 
lose in even the mostventureso:n.e venture, and in any caso noval' 
eo easll,., so oompletoly as if' tt wCr'S nothinc ••• onefs solf'.,,21 
:: 
The venttlre 1s a eri:!is in the struGgle batvt'een freedom and dospai; 
when despaIr is that ::t finitude • 
. t:-:loll1selves to ~he c(mventlons -of society. They are sna.red in 
fa.hS-oua. fher aN .... okl •• br pub11c opialon. . B ••• thei!' .. _1'&1. 
lty Is formed by soolnl cortV'entions.~.Avel'lricat5.on 0f all thIs 
_,. be tOlQlcl 1n the .rot. tln,. of 8l8ll7 ... plean pa7ohOlos'.'.. lot 
t"lat they are bemoo,nln::; this "dospair" into which modern man ha • 
• llpp." On th ••• nt ..... " to. tb.e .at put the,.titaoouagttvthla 
encul turation ·f man s.nd consoquent loss of' self'.. For exa'Tl'pla. Dl" A......lo., pl'Ote •• ol' ot pa,.eaolQal' at .... 481s Un!"' ••• !'7, 01. 
in his book ~o~~v~tioq and pe~s,onalltl:' that tho term "Perfeot Man 
baa take. on .. ne. -atiilll .l.pu ao.let,._ In the thl.t· •• ath 
oontury 1t denot1l-:l the ~'3pll1ttual :nan, !n'the sixtoenth centUl7 
l' •• '.%'IIe4 to t~ 1 ••• 11.0,.&1 ... but toctal 1'_ on17meanlns 1. 
the psychologIcally healthy rJan.. Wb..1.t 1a mot-e .. lEI. man is psycholo. 
gleall!' heal'.,. 1t he exPerieno •• no cont1.1ota between him.elt and 
his social milieu. Aecordini) to K1erksGan:",1, thin Is the 10s3 of 
a.l.f 1n 80018-,.. I' 18 the 4.8p_1. ot tlal'ude. Man haA 8014 hi. 
birthright rOJ! a l':lGSS of pottage: he has substituted social pre .... 
tlga tOl' hi' Divine •• llla,. fbS,·./ .... tt1fnlde 18 also pre • .."t 11 
modern lite~ature. T.S. Eliot, whom ~ny reter to as the greatest 
11terfU"7 o ommentato:ron OUP age, haa .~re ••• d this aoclal de.pal:p 
in h1 s poem -lJ'he Love Song ot J • Altred Prutrock." 
2lS1eknes~·unto Death, p. 52. I 
----_.--- ~', , 
Despair Viewed under the Aspects of 
P093ibl11ty/Heeosslty 
We hav. Just; consldePed how the selt 1s 11able to dsspaip 
in the PPOo ••• 01' lntlnltlssation. Ha .... v.r. even It a man should 
COrMotl,. understand himselt in the m.irror or ll11&e;ination, thez-e 
stll1 remalna the pos.ibility ot d.spair in the procesa ot actual-
ization, 8.S the pelatloD. "late. Itsolt to Its own .elf. It a 
d18Nlatlon.hlp oocurs bere, man taIls 1n.o either tbe deapail' or 
po •• ibill,,. 01' that or D .. eS81ty_ 
The d •• pair ot po •• lbility 18 due to the lack ot n80e881t7. 21 
At'." lntlnltl.atlon, the .elt 1a Ju.st a8 nec ••• uy as It 1. po.-
sible, but po •• lbll1t., _" outJ'UD neee.alt1.21 A man mal ne"eJ' 
aotual! •• hi. po.albla aelf by bringing 1t into necesatty. be 
ma7 be content to v1 .. his many posslbilltl •• as ther are 1n thG~ 
aelY8'. POI'" example, a .an __ 18.e t~t he le quite eapabl* ot 
per~o~ a ee~'alD ' •• k, but he neva. Cboo ••• to 40 1'_ and 1ft 
taot he neVe. 400' 1'_ n. 81m.p17 .a1-, "Y •• , I could do that ••• 
\ 
1t.... !he. uU- "pH,.nt. hJpoth.tloal nee ••• lt,., fop he ean 
only do the ' •• k ~1 bringing poSSibilIty Into nee.aetty, and 
there tore makIng it aotual. 
Through the p ••• age of' time, man become. more and more po .. 
aible and le.8 and less neces8&I7_ IUs margin of time narI'OW8, 
;1. t .' 
2i1b14., P. 54. 
23Ib1d. 
and possibility benOlneo more 1.ntonse e~ch ln~te.nt. However, actu-
e.lizt1.t1.on requires t1~i'1eJ ant'. 80 1 ts posslb111 ty. or the po :1~lb111 ... 
ty of the self, decJ.:"'&tises "tilth t.ht' nnr1"ow1.r.g of tine. 
~.K. is em.phat1.o on tbe l~elatlons e:d.st1ng Qmcn~~ possl-
1 dol. 1 ty, neoses! ty. and actual1 ty~ The phl1osophe!"s, he stateSt 24 
explaIn necessity as n unity of pasa1.b111ty and actualIty. Aoeox-d'll 
i'!1:'; to IU.erkegns:-d, this 1s not the caso. 'rhe "r~ally J.."'eal" is 
actua11 t,., and this 1s a nynthesis of posslb111 t~r and nece:~ s1 ty. 
Porhap!l the ttO:3t l'lubtl.e problem we meet in cur analys:i s of diaIso-
tloa.l freedom. is this attenpt to d1scc;vor the preoiso n~ture of 
Kter-keeae.Xtd's neoessity. f{hat 15 the preoise natLl.re cf that wh!cn 
ncces~31ty utlds to possibility? l'¥llat 1s neeesslt:r in nctual:tty?ll 
In ol'der to avoid a distort1on of K,ierkegutlrd's thour:;ht, it 'Clayh. 
to quote at length here 8. paEHlIage wherein he treats this matter. 
lior 1s 1. t merr::;ly due to lacl! or ~3tl"ength when' the soul r,oes 
•• 'JI&J in po.alb11,.,.-.t 1 ••• t '~la 18 not to be u&eJ:t"ooCl 
as people commonly undeJ.:'stnnd 1. t.' Wh~treall: is la.ck1nr.: 18 M lS!e, to orr" to 8S!?fit to tbe'iiiie.sai "1no~~~Sr;' 10 
w.utt· may~ eelL. erl one' s m~r. '""'!'heret'cre \:le"i~1is:::Ozt une 
40 •• not oon.l., 1n the fao" that s\loh •• e1f d.id not aeotm' 
to anyth1n(~ in tho \vorldi no, th~ n: sfortune ttl that tho man 
.~ !!!lb ••• - ~.ar~ of b,1 •• 1r.-a:waX'e Vii! 't!ii •• 11' Iii""'11, 
TSa perree!!y C1ef'!ntte 3coe!F,!n:;, and so 1s the nece~~s!tr:r. 
on the coat •• ." he loat ht •• elt. owing to the tact that thi. 
self was seen fantnstlcal1y renootod in thepossiblo. E'len 
a4~bld., p. 55. 
25Ph:t.s same problem will :rEtour in chapter IV when we treat 
of actual.ization. It will sho" up there in dealing w1th s.l:t.ta 
Lutheran:. sm. Did 3.K. adhere to Luther's "Paith without good 
\fox-ks", Oan man beqolft hlmaelf' tbl'Ough Paith alone, or are good 
wo~k. a prerequisite for freedom.? 
4") ~ 
the Inok of lnfin1 tudo .. 11 l-larrcw-m.ln'aedncl so and nct:nness of E!pirit 
.r:.re the two charncteristics of this clospn1.r, nf1t in the sense in 
which they arc usus.lly IL"1d(l"'stood, but in :tn c:thlcrll sense. IS Thl. 
man h!'~s narrowed his'mind, and thet*eby bemeHned hiD spirt t. TIe 
looks at his univorse ~lth colored glasses wh!ch filter out the 
real! ttesof the spirt t, aIld allow him to see merely the ·.~'orldly, 
social lIte about him. This universe 15 c!'uptpled into a cr'::l'ld, 
e.ndhe now fIts into his universe by f1 ttlng into the crowd. Bis 
aotions are determined by'the conventions c-f scclety, and ho is 
content to flleasure out hIs life 1n cofrea spoons. In this wPy, 
he. loses himself', for he fInds it too dangerous &.."10. venturoSNlle 
to become h1.tlself. :HOVI much mor-e OESy to becC'me [In :L:rLltation ot 
ot~ersJ to bee~,me a n'lmber,. a cipher- in the crowd. 
Natura:!' 'V, this form of despair is nover nctleed by tte ?Jcrld. 
for it is a flt1:tng into the world. Tr1f.n:'o 1s no contrr"st between 
self andsoelety. s.nd whe:.r:·e t:v~re is n6thln.r: to be notioed, i tis 
tpreelsely nothing thnt will be not1oed.19 Therefore, the world w1l~ 
never understand. this to be despaIr, for 1. t reeo[:nizes despair 1n 
a.n::dety, an1 where there 1.8 nothinG, there can be no anxiety. 20 
181.1:>14_, p.< 50. 
19Ibld ... p. 51. 
-
20No doubt this to~ of despair w111 be prevalent in any age, 
land oertainl,. it may be predicated very properly ot modern man. 
"The post-modern ElSe" heB becona e.. period in whioh men devote 
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This despair is a loss of self ~.n society, and to -:;hnt extent 
it is n failure to become the solf. It requl~es Q vonturesone 
splrl t to ovel'·<~orr:.o th.e attraction of thi3 dOBra!.r '.v;1en~.n the rn.id8 ~ 
of a ~JOelf;)ty i'i"hosa nujor conc~e!ms aro t G;:1?::l~al and finite. To be-
come a self is a vantUI'D, :.tnd yet the sClotnl mind says that 
;':1inded man ~e!lsons d lrrerently, sa:rlnE;: 
so drcl:Hlfully CH1:3Y to lose that whioh It'.'''0uld bo dLffic';llt to 
lose in ove:n the Most VC!1tureso:l'te 'Ilent"t}:t'"e, and in [;.ny Ctl30 nOVG1' 
So ea.sily, so oomplotely as l.f it ~1."cr>e nothll1~ ••• one' s self'. ,,21 
when despair is that ~r finitude. 
t:-lomselves to tho conventions ·of' society. Thoy al~e Stlaro!l in. 
·fa.hlona. The,. aN .haokled by publio oplnion •. Bven. tn.irmoral. 
lty is fortnG1 :Jy sooinl co:nvontlons~~ A verlflcatlon ,yt all th':.s 
--1 be found 1n the .rltinal or many amerioan PS1chologlata. lot 
tl-tat they are bentoe.nln: this "despaIr- int::'! which 'Tlodorn man has 
.lipped, On the eontravr, tor the .oat part they enoourage tht. 
enc"ltl tu't"ation r man a.nd oonso::auent loss of sal f'.. For cxa::lpla, Dx-
Adi. "slow. prof ••• or ot paycholoS., at Brudels Unl"Vtu,aitJ. lI'riA 
in his bool~ ~!ot.i. VClt ton and Personal! ty, that the tor!.1 "Pel"'foct Titian 
bas tacen on .. new meanIng In 'so!ern so01et1. In the thirt.enth 
century it denote:!. tb.o . . spIrt tual man, in' the sixtoonth century 
i' referred to tbe In •• l1eotual man. but t04a1 1t, only meanlns 1. 
the psychologloally haalt!lY r.tan. Wh:at 1$ r:l()1"O,. H lUlU is psycholo-
gleallJ' b.ealthy 1t he exPerlenee. no contlict. between h1mself and. 
his s:)clal milieu. Acaord.1ni~ to K1e:rkei3~ul:J. thIs i:3 t:w J.oss of 
selt 1n socletl. 1\ 18 the 4eapal" ot t1nl't;ude. Man has 801d h1. 
bl :rth.:ri.i;ht ~or a noss or pottage; he has substituted social pres-
tige tor hia Divine ealling. Tb18/same attitude 18 also pre"ent 11 
modern llteratLtre. T.S" !\:liot, whom nkiny refer to as the greatest 
literary oommentator-on our age. haa expressed thla aoo1al deapaI..,. 
1n his poem -The Love Song 01' J. Altred Prufrock." 
21;;S.:;l.:;.o.;;,;lm.,&.;;;;.,;;.S .. $ ~ !(!at,h, p. 52. ! 
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in looking at onets self in a mirror it is requisite to know 
oneself; for, if not, one does not behold one's self but mere .. 
ly a man. But the mirror of possibility is not an ordinary 
mirror, it must be used with the utmost precaution. flor of 
this mirror it is true in the highest sense that it 1s u falSE 
mirror. That the self looks so and so in the possibility of 
itself is only half truth; tor in the possibility of itself 
the self is still far from itself, or only half itself. So 
~ question!! how .2 ~ecassitl S?!. 2 self determines .ll 
more Rreo{se1f. -X-case analogous to possnrriity Is when a 
CIUrd Is Inv! ad to part tcipa.te in some pleasure or another: 
the chIld is at once willing, but now 1 t is a question whethtU 
the parents wil~permit i t ...... and !.! .!!!a 2. parents, .!2 II !! 
.!..!!!l neoaasitz· 
There are at least two possible intel"'pretations of necossi ty which 
we could dr'aw from this passa.ge. The first interp:t~etation \'fould 
sa:; that necessity involves a real physical aot on the part of man, 
whether that act be spiritual, as an act of' the will, or raaterlal, 
as the bodily performance of some aotion. This is basad on S.K.'s 
statement that the laok ofnecassity is not due to a lack of 
strength. but to til. lacl, of th.e power to obey, to submit to the 
v 
necessary in oneself,. Stl~enAth is in:r.~rred in the posslb1.l1 ty of 
becoming a self, for without it the :Jelt would be lrnnossible. 
'llherafore, stren:;th refer. to possibility rather than to necessity. 
Neoessity is introduoed into the self through the power .!?2. obey, 
the Eower !2 submi,t. This imnllea man's will, but not merely as 
a power to choose between alternatives, for this would simply be 
a str:~ng~.~, whioh refers to possibility. .!ill. rflay be understood 11 
another senue though'; namely, as Ii dynamio act, the act of willing 
2.6 Ibid., pp. 55-56. (emphasis added) 
-
1'7 
'"1' 
the ph::::>ase "tho r>m,er to will; tb.e powor to sri,omit". "Pow~r" here 
1s not 0. ~:')cs31bl1t ty, but a pb.yslcal act en tho ~'~art 0f :n~:ln; an 
act of tl:.e ....,111. If th1 s intl)rp..:'ets.tlon it} ccrrect, th!3n a bett&p 
"the Dower _o~ ob" , 
ine; the ;eower;: .s! ~ul?mit~ln~". This would better hring out t~e 
inteItpretation that tfpowor" 1.8 not to be taleen a.s a source (if 8.13. 
tlv1.ty, but as the activity itself. 
The neeon1 tnt~rp!"etatlon would claim that neoessity is 
morely a ce2tain awarene,3S in i1v~n of what he really is in ht:'l.1self. 
This awareness may involve sC(10thlng: moro than a st:nple u;1c:0r3tan& 
:tnz; it msy ult1mately be ldont1,fled with u bel:tof c!' faith, But 
the root of this position is that this awareness ts sllf!"iclo1'lt for 
K1erl:e.:::,e.ard f s nc:cesslty; no other e,ct cf man, Ot" human aot, :to 
caller! for. ThL:: ur'Gumentatlon attaehes itself to the \'Vol:'ds: 
"Th.e rn~.srcrtune is that the man dId n~rt bo"!omE:~ F\.ware of h5.n'lself. 
aW9.1"e that the self he let 18 ;;( per.f'ectlj':1etln:t te s~,methin,;, and. 
so 1s the necessary." J .. ack of necGssi ty is thc't"cby a.pparently 
It 18 Intcrent1ng to note that either IntoI'pl"etation can 
appeal to ~1.K. t s own analogy as a oonfir-mation of 1 ts post tlcn. 
The rulology concerns the connection between a ohi ld t s desll"oa and 
his parents' pel"mlssion. On the one hand, parental permission Qan 
add no l"tore to the child than a deeper aWfll"oness of' the pleasuve. 
This ad/J.a weie;ht to the second 'interpretation. On the other hand. 
~ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------, 
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parental permission is the ne~es3arl element whioh must be present 
before the child actuall~e~ the possibility_ The first interpre-
tation would stress S.K.'s oonoern here with the element of 11eoe8-
51 ty instead of with an added awareness which permission conv'0Ys 
to the cbild. 
Several faotors extrinsic to the passage quoted favor 
the first interpretation, 1,e. that necessity educes a physioal 
act on the part of man. First. Kierkagaal'"d t 8 religious works dis-
play the reourrent theme that thought without consequent aotion 1s 
worthless. Seoondly, if the syntheSiS bet\veen possibility and 
necessity is not more than an awareness. then this second dialectic 
is reduoed to the first. intinitizat10n. A relation would be a 
self by being awa.I"e of i taelf. Freedom would be merely sel.f.'-knowl-
edge_ Thirdly, KieI"kegaard in other contexts makes it quite clear 
that freedom 11es in the area of will:, rether than in the a.rea of 
intellect. For oxample, he writes: "The more consciousness, the 
A man who has no will 
.................. --- .................................. 
!l all !! !!9. selt; the more will he has, the more consciousness of 
self he has also.,,27 
Now we will turn our attention to the despair of neeessity. 
'rhe despair of necessity is due to the lack of poSSibl1ity.28 
27Ibid., pp. 43-44. Admittedly, the term "consciousnoss" 
deflni tery-connotes m.uch the same mea.nin:·: as "awareness," and 
therefore this <!uotation could perhaps be u.scd to mediate between 
the two interpretations rather than favor either. (emphasis added j 
28Ib1d •• p. 57. 
~-----------, 
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Kierkegaa.rd oorllpares this jespalzt to dumbness, whe.J:>e there 1s no 
possibility of speeoh. In necessity, there 1s no possibility ot 
the self. 
All things are eternally possible for God. This is the 
decisive faot which leads S.K. to say that the loss of possibility 
1s despair. Since everything 1s eternnlly possible for God, it Is 
also possible at eaoh instant.. Objectively spealdnc;, there can be 
no loss ot possibility, for God's power is eternal. The loss is 
only subjective. because a man loses faith in the taot that all 
things are nossible in God. But a subjeotive loss is a loss of 
the subject; it is a loss of self. 
This despair Is the final I1'ejectlon of faith, and there .... 
fore comes only when a man Is brought to the utmost extremity.29 
In the extremity., the question of possibility resolves 1 taelf into 
a question of faith, for a man is incapable of coping with extreml • 
. ,
" 
ties by himself. The question lSI '1111 he believe? Kierkegaard 
pictures a man who imagines to himself in terror some horror which 
is absolutely not to be endured. Then precisely this horror be-
falls him. As a mere man, he visions certain destruction, and 
despair fights to destroy the proportion of his beln.;~. Despair 
casts off possibility and clln~s to the neoessity of destruction. 
HumClnly speaking, despaIr 1s the mcst ·~ertain thine of all for him 
Then baSins the fight of fal ttl, "which fl.;hts :nudly (:.f one would 
. " 
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so express it) for posslbl11ty.nJO The man cannot live withou.t 
possibility, for to lose this is to fall into despair, and despair 
is the sIckness unto death. Therefore, in human e xtrclm1.ty, life 
is only possible through faith. Klerkagaard. Vlrltest "Sotn13tlmes 
ti:1S inventiveness of a hurnan inl'agina'blon suffices to procure pos-
slbllity, but in the last reBert, that Is, when the point 1s to 
believe, the only help is this, that feI' God all thin:~:s are posi-
... ' .. iii 
ble. nJl To 'believe in the possible 1s what 1 S flleant by tal th.32 
We .tu:we said that the ultimate question is wheth;:lI" or not 
the man will believe. S.K. himself interprets this as meanlng 
whether or not the man has the will 12 EI'02U~ for himself posslblJ .. 
ity.)) Again we •• the importance of the will over the intellect 
Fa.ith is an aot of' the wlll. Yet, even this act of: the will which 
is faith accomplishes only possIbility. This is not the self; j,t 
is not freedom.. Freedom is actualization. Which 18 the synthesis 
" between possibility and necessIty. That .La to say, faith, as im-
portant as it Is, is only one element in freedom. 
Of all the fo:rrtls ot despair that we huve viewed thus far, 
despair of necessity cOl'I'esponds most closely to what is commonly 
understood by n:iespaiI'". After a man reeognlzes the value of lea.d .. 
JOIbid., p. 59 
-31Ib1d., pp. 59-60. 
-
32Ibld., p. 60. 
J.3 Ib1d• 
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ing a. good lIfe (and has therefore CODlf.1jtt)d himself by loaping 
from the acsthetioal to t he ethical sphere). he eventually dis-
covers through repes. ted falls that he is net capable of consistent 
goodness. His status as a sinner before Oed is forcibly impressed 
upon his mind. Then comes the temptation to despair. for he knows 
that he is unable to achieve his commitvnent. He tends to aoknowl 
edge a neoessal"Y' disproportion in his being. At th~.s point, he 
must either will to believe, or willfully contract the siokness 
unto death. Faith alone will procure possibility 1n the Dower of 
God; by faith alone wl1l man presel'Ve hlm:Jelf in freedom. 
This completes our treatment of the various forms of des-
pair. Now we will briefly consider' the qualitative aspect of des-
pair; that is, despair viewed under consciousnoss. 
Despair Viewed under the Aspect of 
Consclou.sneS,$ 
As the forms of despair are determined by the nature of 
mants dialeotical synthesis, the quality of despair 1s determined 
by the degree of consciousness. Every Increase in the de(~;l"ee of 
consciousness effeots a proportionate inorease in the intonsity of 
despair. 34 AccordIng to this scale, S.K. shows why the dovilts 
despaIr is the most intense despair, for the devil is sheer spirit 
and the:'efore absolute consciousness. 
52 
Kl(~rkegaaro speaks i'1rat ot: the despair ".,rb,lch is uncon ... 
sclous that it is Jespair. or the despairin;:: W1conscic'usness of 
ha vinr:' a selt and an et3rnal self • .35 Since consoiouane::.s is the 
detoJ:l'tnln&!1t or intensity, it follows that an unconscious despair 
should be the least intense of .Coll. Aotually, Kierkegaard. wri tes 
of this despalr as a sert of innooen06. 36 but he goes on to show 
that the responsibility is just as personal in this case as in 
any other. God endowed man with spirit, and with this gift he is 
resoonslble for being conscious of hlm,,sclt. 
Despair oan onlY' be unconscious If a man refuses to use 
the spiritual gifts God has given him. Yet his very refusal im-
plies the use of these gifts; rather, it implies a misuse, for m.an 
is using his wl1l to divert his intellect from a self-1ntrozpectioI. 
By these means he mana.ges to remain unconscious cr his despair. 
The truth of this is seen in the manner' a rnan roacts to an unvell-
ing of h:Ls sickness. lie wills to keep this despair Shl"ouded in 
darkness and considers it an insult if aeroGone should point out 
to him. h~s slckness.37 To disillusion another of hls deena!r Is 
com.l1lonly considered to be a grievous, p<;lrsonal affront. 
When a man refuses to ::lCt accordtng to his 8;11"i tual natura, 
.35Ibid., p- 66. 
36 . 65. Ibid., p. 
-
37Ibid •• p. 66. 
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he allows his sansuous natur~ f<nd the psycho-sensuous to dominate 
him oompletely.38 He begins to live in the sensuous cato[,:ories 
of a,greeable/dlaa[~reeab1e.39 In short, ho hal3 ,:-:hosen the career 
of an aesthete Inorefercnce to his real self. 2.K. likens the 
::l1.tuation of such $. mun to thl:lt of a pex'son who has received 
the gift of a beaut1 . .t"nl house, and thon I'oruses to use tho wel1-
furnished, upper rooms. He l1"ves his life in the cellar. Thls 
1s Hnalogous to the porson who decIdes to 1 :tve .r::lorely as n body 
and never as a soul. 
Although unconsciousness of despa.1I· 'artakcs of intene!. ty 
to fl lesser degree than oonsciousness, nevertheless 1 tis a ::1101"'e 
da.ngerous state in whioh tol1ve. A m.an carmot cure this sickness 
unto d€)ath unless he ~~ l.rst beoome oonsoious of It. Just as despal 
is in 1 taal! a. negattv1ty, unconsolou.snesG of 1 t 13 a new negntlvl .. 
ty.40 A person must piepce throuGh :,bo.th these negativitles in 
., 
" 
o:rder to relate hlnlself to hts o'Wn naIr correctly. To become con-
soious <.f despair and then to 1.'11111 to remain :tn this sickness 
is U ::;l:'IElat intensifioa.tion, but the greater dancer still lies in 
unconsciousness. In the latter insta.nce, the neoessi ty of r:t;~htin~ 
for freedom will never be recognized. 
Atter unconscious desDa1r, Klerke!:!;aard then writes of "the 
38Ib1d., p. 67., 
-
39.lli!S_ 
40Ibid., p. 69. 
-
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dsspslr vhich 1s conscious of boing despair, as also it Is 
conscious cf bein,{t e. self \!hcrein thore 1s (lfter n11 !3ol7lOthinc 
Eternal, nnd then is €Ii thaI' in despair Sot not 'i1'lillin::; to b~~ i tselt 
or in despair at willing to be ltself.u41 
Thore are two re::luisitea which must he fulfilled before 
uoor:30n will be conscious of bein,! in ,iesp12ir: (1) t~le true con-
ception of what despuir 1s; (2) a clarity of self-l{nowledge)t2 
Both of these admit of variant defrees, thus mul ttplyinr: the fms-
si,ble derrees of copsciousness. ;';, .. K", says that more eorr...rnonly than 
not, a man's "osition is that cf a half obscurity about hls'les-
'Oalr.4.3 Al though this obscurl ty is ;~reatly accounted for by the 
faot that. mtilD has narfact knowledze of neither- himself ncr cf the 
nature of despair, 1 t is n:!vcrtheless true that a good deal of' 
this obscurl ty 1s oaused by rnan himself. A man can purposely will 
this darkness of intelleot in himsel1! 1.n or-dEn" to provIde a self.,. 
justification for his way of life. SirleS it ls the tctal ;nan who 
experiences obscurity, both intellect cind will pJ_ay thoir part. 
"In faot there Is in all obscurity a dialectical intarulay ot 
k.'1owledge and Will, and 1n interpretln;{: a :nan one I;UlY err, either 
by emphasIzing knowledge merely~ or merely the 1.\1111.,,44 
41l!!!s!., p. 74. 
''.l 
Lj.c'Ibid., 1')p. 74-75. 
-
h3l.£.!.!!., p. 75. 
44Ibldfl p, 76. 
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As a person bl;cornes ccn3cious of his d.espa:.r, t;h~!~J con-
sc :'.ousne sr. rll~st manifests ;~ ts(;lf in despair at not w:!.ll! to be 
oneself. K1arkegaard calls thin the despair of w~akne~aJ4S for as 
a. me.n recoGnizes the eternal wi thin h:,msolf J he be~:ins to cringe 
hefore the consequent responsibility. He.!.s unwl1linC to h'::ve to 
be himsolf. lie dee a not wa!1.t to be h:!.r:lself. fl'his eonsc iousnesf'lS 
:;ay continue to 1n(~rease, and then a nan not only fncoB the eternal 
in himself, but he becomes SHverc of h1.s r:o£.l:...."loss In~:onfrontin:.:' 
etern1ty. This wouknoss is rope1linC, nnd now more than eve;', the 
man dces not will t~ be himself. 
This dialectio continues wi th the inc 'easing i.nten~J:trica-
tlon of consciousness. Soon the dcspairer becomes conscious of 
tz10 reason why he does not wlll to be himself. He discovors that 
he 1s repelled by his own weakness. He wants to be ntrong rather 
than weak. and in that desire, he wlU1:l. to be other than ho really 
1~:;. He \':1l1s to be hlmsel,f (as he hus" fashioned h:tmself), hut thie 
self which he wishes to be is not his true self. In this WHY, des ... 
pair has dial'9ctioally reversfJd i tscif. No lonrer is the me.n in 
dospair at not willing to be himsel.f. Now he hus .fallen into the 
dospah" of w1l11ng despa.iringly to be himself.. This is the def.rpal~ 
of defianc6,46 and it has evolved from the jespair of wealr..ncss. 
Klerkegaard cautions us against considerlng these two 
I • 
1~5IbiCl.' p. 78. 
46Ibld •• p. 107. 
qualiflcatlona of despair, wooJenesa and def:!.a':1ce, 8.3 total cUs-
jiax'! t:te s. "No tleapair, ft he wr:l tea, entlrelv without defiance: 
" 
to be. f On the other hand, evan tho 0xt:-:-oemest defiance of despair 
1.8 after all nevor wi thout 30;71C weakness. The c:lffcrcnco :LS 
there:f'ol"e only relat.ive. ,.47 ;;~efll{nes.:'.l antI de.flonce a1:'O '.le~~'l·cCl:~ of 
intenslty, and '0arnl1al one'! conaclou3~ens 2f being 
In despair. 
Despair is Sin 
Kierke(Saard plaoed the second half of Sickness unto Death 
-------- ---- -----
under the heading "Despair 1s Sin",. Al thour;h 'm!J have a,lreac.y 
stated that this part of thE' book is In'operly. theoloe~cnl, and 
theref'ol'e does nc;t dlrectlyrH:'lrtaJ.n to this thos:ts, .t t nay hol~, 
our understand'.ne of dasps.!.!' to investigate briefly it/hat S,.K. has 
to say on this topic. 
Klerkesaard sum:marizes the :':'(';llationship betV'Joen despal r 
and sin in h:!.3 deCln:!. tlon of 3'.n: "Sln 1. s th ~ s: befcl'c God, or 
with the conception of God, to be in despair at not w!11in~ to be 
oneself, or in despalr D.t w5.11in,:,': to be oneself. Th.:.:s sin is po-
tentl€:l.ted wea.kness 01'" potentiate~1 defiance: sin is tho potentia-
tien of desre.lr,. The "oint upon whiGh the emphasIs rosts is beror 
God. (iX' the fact that ti:e conception of God 1.3 involved; the faoto 
-
~~--------------~ 
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which di rn lectioa11y, ethically, roligiously, ~akes 'qualified' 
despair s::nonym.olls with sin 1 s the c:onception of Go::!. ,,48 Tl:t s 
Ba.ld of despa.ir. Qualifle.:! (l~3pa:tr :is the des~')ah" :"if weakness 01" 
defh\nce. 't'hen thts conscj,ous despah' sees itself as ;;tan::11:1n'; 
bef'c:·re God, wenknesn and3.(l'fianC0 b<)(~~):ne potentitted; th.a t s, the~ 
:Notice the emphasis that S.K. gives to the fact that stn 
is before God. This meens that personal sin enters a :na.n's 1:tfe 
only after the ethical has man!:rested itself to hi~l, .r.l!ld he is 
forced into a consciousness of his spiritual drunkenn()[:ls. He sees 
himself transparently beforo God [is a sinnt1r. Th1s vision cf what 
sin is bei,~omes possible tk'..rough a r~velatton from God .. 49 and this 
revelation is Christ, or the Detty in time. 50 
Without a lengthy dtscussion of ::thls point, let us br1ef-
ly explain what it involves. Kierkegaucl, in his ~r;ncludln,~ !!!2"" 
soientifio Postscript, dlstlnsulshe3 bet-;JEHm what he tcr:ns RelL-,.,lor 
• 
A and RelL;lon 13, or natural r:J:lli~:1on arid Chr:stian1.ty. The l11'-
ference, o! course, is Christ. Furthermore, as '::ui:.t-consolous ... 
ness51 is 1:'01 ated to ~(~l l;;lcn A, 80 ::rtn-consQ iousnc fLJ is reID. ted tc: 
48Ibld., p. 123. 
-
49Ibid., p. 155. 
-£:.'0 ~ Conoludln~ Unscienti!ic PostserlEt, p. 5L7. 
5l'f,Juilt-eonsclousness" is the natural priok of consoience 
which accompanies a. manta recognition that through his om -
~~----------------~ 
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nelic10n n. or Ch.rist:tanlty,52 Althour:h 1:-1. ;nan 18 ahle to c\ cqll~.re 
nlilt-consclousneas hy himself', his rOLCttion to Ch~ist r1ll:1t 'he 
l:no\'Jn in c::"'der to o.chleve 31n-consc1ousness.53 '11hls is tho rovo-
lation from God as Mentioned -hove. This clarifies Kiorl-;:c!~n.a:~"'::P s 
insistcmce -'::;hat 3in is identified I,vi th (lespair only when despair 
Is befo!'e God, or in thf' concept of (':rOd. 
All this has been a dIscussion of personal sin, for as 
wc have oeon above, Man 1s rosDons1.ble for the orc0ortlon in t.he 
cUalectioal sJIlthesis of his self. However, we should note here 
that personal Sin, fer Kierkegaard. Is grounded in orLginal 3in. 
In tho Postsoript .. he \vri tes: "Let us now call the untruth of the 
!'4 • 't 
lnd5viduHl Sin.. Viewed eternally he c~lnnot be !:dn, nor enn he be 
-
eternally presuPPo3ed as he-vini:; b~en in sin. By cominS into axis-
tenee therefore ••• ha becm:'1cs a s1nnol~. lie is not born a::-l a s1n-
ncr in the sense that he is presuPPo!3,,:ed ;)s bein~ a sinner before 
he 1s born .. hut he is born in ain a.nd as a sinner.. Th::.3 we mir'ht 
call Ori-rinal Sin. "54 Existence is i;he 4.edlu~ of sin, [md the mer4 
j -
fact tha.t a man ('lomes into Gxintence makes }. t !,osniblo for :lim to 
comr;1i t personal sin. Accordlnu: to tutheri'tn!_sm, ~'lhich l;W.fJ the stat~ 
'fll 
fault, he has not become the man he Is supposed to 00. He tl8.S 
lost his freeclOm. But he ca.n recognize this natural fact oven 
before he realizes his failure is seen by the eyes of God. 
"....':') ;Jc...concJ;.ud:tn~ ;t!nsciemtlflc Postsoript, P. 517. 
53Ibid. 
-54Ibl~., p. 186. 
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rellf;ion in Dentnark dur:tn~; rds lifetime, ~ .. K. tnuzht that thehllD1&J 
will is co!'rupted by cz;i(:;lnal sin, end this corruption explalns tbA 
possIbility of any per~;onal sin. He writes: "Christlllnly under-
stood, sin 11es in the will, not 1n the intellect; and thla corrup. 
tion of the will goes well beyond the conso1ousness of the IndIvldll-
a1. This is tho perfectly consistent declaration, tor otherwise 
the questIon how s1n began must arise ''lith respeot to eaah incUv1.dlli 
ual.-55 
Certainly this teaohing that human nature 1$ oorrupted by 
original sin, rather than wounded by it, is strict Lutheran doo-
trine. \i'b.ether or not Kierkegaard' 3 Ilutheranism. went to tho ex-
tr-eme position of "faith \d thout good works· may be debated, and w. 
will treat this nlong. with aotualization. The problem will ,focus 
there because faith, not virtue, is the oppos1te of sin. "Too ott~~ 
1t has been overlooked th.at the oppotJ1tG or sin 1s not virtue. not 
, u • 
by any manner of meana. This 1s '.n pn:rt a pagan v:1evl which is oon-
tent wi th a Merely human measure und properly d cas not knO'll'J what 
s1, 1s, that all sin is before God. No, th,~ cp;po~:t~G ££. ~ !! 
talth, as Is art'1~'led In Rom. llp2), 'whatsoever 1$ not of faith 11 
I "I 
811'1 ••• 56 Thus, in this context faith 1s identified with t he prope~ 
p:roport1on between lnTinlt1&ation and actualiution. These two 
moments in (Ualeot1oal heedom remain to be explored. 
I. . d 
e~ #~Siekne8s unto Death. P. 15S. 
fIr .........., JM ' • 
56Il?~d., p. 132. 
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CHAPT'!:!";H III 
We have already seen that freedom is a dialeotic between 
1ntlnltlzatlon1 and actualization. Z Kierkegaard developed his ab-
straot .formulation ·of these two functions 1n Sickness unto Death, --~----.. ---- -----
and the first chapter of this thesis 1s an attem:;Jt to explain that 
formulation. To a Great Elxtent.S.K. entered the category of 
tormal philosophy when he wrote the SiCknEHU. His treatment is 
• 
logical; hIs te~inolo[;sY abstract; his method systematic. These 
a.re the very elements ,':!hich he re jepted as W orthleas in other ph11o-
sophers, and consequently he was sornem. at disappointed wi tll the 
• 
lS.K. him.self does not use this t~n"'Il1 "inflnitizatlonu to 
eha::'act81':tze tht8 fIrst n:lOn1':Hlt in!i ..al:·ctic.nl ft"'1cdClm, ant so a. 
Vlord or explanation is in order for the ehoice of this terminolog 
](.,call that the self is n l">eln t.ion whi0h !,olv.to3 tt::wl f' to tts own 
self. a.nd that the original relation 1s a synthesis between inrin! 
tude and finitude. Tho first J1Oll1(~nt in dinl'''loticnl frc';do111 1:3 an 
imaginative consoiousness of the ln~in~ t.~ posfJibill ties in a fini t 
being. Thus, S.K. \1'1':'"1 t13s: "Accor(nn~!y, the clevelopmant consists 
1n movine away fx-om oneself infinitely by the process of infinitl-
zing oneself, and in returning to oneself Inftn1tely by tbe pro-
08a. ot' .t'1n1tlzing." (Sic~!ss unto D!.a.th, P. 44.> The context 
makes this ~+'at~mont not a trt't16ambrguous, and it c(mld be con-
strued in ~moh a way that "'1n!'lnit1zation" would refer to the firs 
moment in freedom, and "'finitization" would correspond to what we 
have called "a.ctualization". More probably however, S.K. meant 
that both o~ these ~lements are functions in the first moment of 
60 
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tone of thi g beok • .3 !{e d1d t10t '.7ant hl g v!pl ti'1'o;8 to 1."0£'100 t the 
r1111030:>11101:11 method of s;:H':cl-llatlon.· 
nresch to his sUbjoct. H~ WDG treatins the sa~e r~Dl t~Ut~3 of 
Slckne::; s '..:.nto Beath, but he ',~~ S ;:1llch mOl"0 f:mtlsfled wi th tIlts new ~------ ---- . 
approach. 
The purpose of this chapt(~r is to ':Dc..lmlnc S .. K. t s phenom-
onolo~lcBl approach to lnflnitizatton. This notion is at the root 
The Pres~nt Ar'E'l, and. 
- .....--
1,7orks of Love • 
...;..;;...;;;.;;.---
In an effort to reflect a ~lt of ~~e b03Uty in S.K.ts 
dlalectic:11 freedom. In that case, my use of tho te:J:1f1 ttlnt'lni.tlze.~ 
tion" to express the totality of this moment is an instance of 
synecdoche. Per~lt'l.nS I m.ir,:b.t htwe ;')ref'or-abl V chosen thd te:L"'m "pos-
sibility· since the end product of this first moment is the im.agi-
native consciousness of the salf accard1n; to its possibilities. 
The more a man knows hi_Mself I the more he knows what he wus made 
to be. Thus this end product :t8 in truth one of the dlal,)ctIc9.1 
eloments involved in the second moment, aotualization. However, 
S.K. himself does not ctilll the orl::1nal s/nthes:ts "possibill ty" I 
and in ordel' to avoid the prima faoie confusion whicr would arise 
by doinr so, I have dectdedq!;o 'use the term. "inrin1 tl zation"'. 
2cf. a~ove, pp. 20-2),}* 
J:£.h.£ J-:aWl1a1a • Pp. 240-241. 
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thOU.Cht, ws l!-l111 treat this chapter on inf~.n1 M.zation in the fol-
lcf 1'tin'- manner. First, we will present on~ of hts onoral nhenom-
enolorJcal ap,.,roaehes to freedoM. ,,,,here he speaks of ~. t in terns of' 
sobriety. Then we will ~e able to devote the bulk of the chapter 
to 30~1e specifio instances of i'1hat tnrini tH~ation rr.eant cor.cretely 
for Kle;"ltegiHl.rd. What were hi~J ideals? How did he picture to him .. 
self the dicnity of man? In 3hort, what did freedom M.enn to 
Klerkegaard? These l"ef'lecttve expressions are simply S.K. t ~ des-
cript10n of him.self as mir-rored in suoh human truths as love, hope 
and pain. 
The Phenomenologioal Self 
C.od call! every indivlt!ual to a certain state of perfoction, 
and it is the t~isk of that indIvidual to attain thts and. nut no 
one oan act ttnless he has his ?urpo8e~ clearly in mind, and so God 
" 
endowed m.an with an ima.gination with which 110 might idealize him-
self, or as S.K .. put it, with 1"hioh he m.ir;ht tn1"inl tize himsel!. 
In his book ~df$e !2!: Yptu:selves, S .. K. speaks of freenom. in 
terms of Christian sobriety, and he says tha.t "to hecome sober Is 
to eC1I113 to oneself in self-knowledGe G.nd hefore God, as nothing 
before Him, yet infinitely .. absolutely, nnder Obligation. ff4 This 
1s a 0101:'<1' statement of what Klarltegaard believes nan is at the 
roots of 1'11.8 nature. It is the formulation of hIs personal rotltle-
-------
!~F'or Selt ... Examination and Jud!;Te for Yourselves, o. 120 • 
.............. _" ............. 1 •• R - • 
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t;':'ou':".:h Christia.nity. ChristIan 30briet:r demands tbat nn.n bo ~on,-
SC:t~!)5 beth:;f" t;1C fact that he ts beforo Cod, cly'd t:'1ut he ts noth 
i':'}::- before l:;od, completely unier obI:'. ,?n.t~on. 
as nothinC. and (3) co~plctoly un~or obl~~at!on, is !nflnitizG-
tion, tho B't"IHl"'(me3!l of Infinl to '):"")331 btl i ty w j. thi.n ft nt. te '"'1un. 1]1 
ti:natcly, this r:16ana that ma.n SGeB h:L:'nrwlf as lovod bJ God .'lnd the. 
his et(~:::-tlal salvation is p03sible throuc;h fnl th. This 1~ the only 
;")owers, t.ll ants, qualifioD. tiona, po ssib!lltifls, (Hid. in t;~G :.Jame 
rn.easnre r~millar wtth what hunan ~md '.';orldly 3:1~Enl'dn~~ss t(,lach<1~ th~ 
ion of them0!'oly htl..'nan v;' e?l. Btlt not lle~l)r,j~_n.·:: to th.Cl C.tu'l sttan 
opinion; .for th1 s :t. s not to OO:!1e to one self 1 it ~. s to~on{3 to t.:1.C 
is ;~h0 world t s l.nt':)roretatton of the :Jo3siblo. It crm !1VC1" J.0ud 
of the 
draws a ~an deeper r.nd deC"DEH' into hlnself coaxinc h-:.f1 to 1)e Inbre( 
r::: 
.JIb"' '1 p. 121 • ..... -:;.:... , 
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and sel!'lS!1,6 
To come to onf.H:H~lr in selt .... knoWledr:ce, and before God. S.it • 
.... - -
held this as the prImary n-;te of self·-:r-ea,lization. A{:~aln and 
again in hls writinGs he lashc)d Ollt tiel'cely tilt the neat, triple-
termed sylloGisms proposed by {)h11osophers a.ttemptin.:.,\" the -various 
meaninGless as fa:;:- as IUerlcegaard was oO!lcerned, but w:lat :ta .!!lOtt-e, 
he .felt strongly that they were insults to God, It one we~e slt .... 
ting in a !"Oom with two frienda, would he not f,:..el inaul ted It one 
turned to the other and began scr1Ciusly to prove his ;;reaonce In 
th.e room, ThIs, said S.K •• Is how God must fa:)l, for' He is pres.n 
to 1':'J.lin at all times. He 1. S l";lore present to man than ;';tan in to hiJQ 
selt. That man should try to prcve God's presence 7.s drunli:enno:Js 
wi th self., 1Ie should rather humbly e,clmowledge God's beIng and 
supremaoy. "Only by being betere Go~. can a man entirely C01:16 to 
• h~mself 1n the transparenol of 30brlety_»1 
To oome to oneself in self ... knowledge and before Cod, as 
-
nOFthln~. This 1s an expression of Chl"istlan hu.ui.llity. It:ts the 
truth of mal t s :)elng in relation to God' s~ U: one stl"ikes a match 
and holds it next to a bright light, he may say the match's liGht 
Is feeble:. Should he hold it nex.t to the tn.ill, he ::Ioul'] not evon 
say it 1s fOfJblo, but that it is nothing. This is what man is "hel 
F r 
6 Ibld. 
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compa.red to ('rOd. "The merely hu.'11B.n view thinkc the. t to becomo 
something is to becomo sober; Christianity thlnl{s th.fit r;recisell 
to become nothing--oef'ore Cod--1.s the way, and that 1f it could 
occur to .snyone to ',,'dsh to l~e 2o~:'lethlnG befc.!'e God, this is drunk-
enness. H8 
nothinG, and yet Ipflnltelll nb,solutclz ~nde.r cbl1f'ation. Since 
God 1s infInitely othc:rt than rnsn, His dominion ov<}tt nan 1.8 also in", 
fin! te. Man does not have the right to sub j\';ct him:;;elf "to n cez-.. 
tutn dee~ree. If While w1 thholding himself s<> mewha t from Divine doml&! 
ion. aod t s reign extends to the nooks and corn.€l"S (If thl9 universe, 
and IUs power reaches into th'2 sr.vl!lest 'lction of the smallest man. 
Absolute swa.y is God' 5, nnd only by placln;!~ h:!.l"l'welf 5ntlnl tely, ab-
solutely. under obl1,3ation is :na.n able to acknowledge thin truth, 
and consequently come to himself in $~lr-knowledge. "This maxtm. 
'to a certain degree,' 1s precisely what intox1catea, anaesthetl-
zas, ma.kes ene heavy and lethargic and torpid and dull, pretty 
much lIke a.n habl tual dl--unkard, of whom 1 t is 8alrS tha.t he folls 
into a state of rlro.slness. ft9 
Refleotive E~esslona 
',Va have studied Klerkegaard t s formula for the inflnl tlzatlon 
Blbi.£!_) p. 123. 
9Ibid. 
-
r 
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enthusiasm. P~rhopn in th!s sectlo~, as we let Kicrkc~~8rd 9~eak 
be ~ore a8?Srcnt. Here ~e ~111 u180 be able to see ,'1,: -1:1:8 "!bite 
c,ut of h:t::lself into tl::e psrt1cul::.r ir;:n,~e be hanponG to be cor-tcm-
flcct tbe ,,:ean1nf: of love. Love 01 s:rcd a strun;:'c, 1'010 1.n his Ilfe 
)";;'88, Once he ur:swcrod: uTo love hlEn ,tVl:o ::121:0:9 ono r:nrpy, :'La to 
H I"efleet~,v() m.5,na an Ina.dequate det'inl"tion of v!r:at. lovE' :t5; to lov4 
bl:'l y,:he nDl:es one unhanp~r out cf Dullea, is Vh't1)C; but to ] ove hil 
H~-; I kn' w, but r::verthelr::s;l the normal form.ula in reflection fo!' 
"IL.at; it is tc, love. ,,10 
It :L s (' t: ny' tc reud in tbE:~ futhor'lS mind the, ccntcxt of this 
stuteJ~nt. ~.K. wrote this as he t~ou~ht of his love for his 
------"'--
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L 
tathe!". lie nev(;.'ll' loved another man as he loved his rathel', and 
paradoxioally, no other man hurt him as did his father. But ~pen 
ltnew that this pain was unknowingly intld.cted; its source was the 
service of love. In this way he united his reflections on love to 
the retlections of his past llfe, idealizing his love in the per-
fect love, and leading himself to a fuller existence In freedom. 
The above definition was but a single expression of love. 
Kierkegaa!*d took many views of thIs topic, and some ot these 1"e-
f1.ectlons are much more nenetratlnc; than others. His comparison 
of love and eternity is impressive for its simplicity of' expresslor 
and depth of thought: 
The temporal has three times, and therefore it never really 
absolutely ex.ists, or absolutely 1n anyone of them.. The 
eternal ls. A temporal object oan be said to have them all 
at one time, iI1SofaI* as it is what it is in these definite 
attributes. But duplioation in itself neV'~,;r has a tem.poral 
object; as the temporal disappears 1n time, so too 1t exists 
only in :i.ts attributes. On the :,c,on trary, when the eternal 1s 
present In a man, then this eternal so reduplicates ftsel:f in 
h1m, that every moment it 15 present in him, it is present in 
a two foIl manner: in an outward direction, and in an inward 
direotion baok into itself, but in such a way that thIs is one 
and t.he same thing; for otherwise it :i.s not dU'.111oatlon. The 
etei"nal is not merely in its own attributes, but is in itself' 
in its attributes; it not only hBS attributes, but Is In it-
self 'ivhen 1 t has \'itttributes. 
So now with love. What love d.oes, that it is; what it 
Is, that it doos--and at one and the same time: at the very 
moment it goes cut ot itself (the direotion outward) it is in 
itself (tho diraotion inward); and at the very mo.ent it is 
in itself. it t!wreby goes out of itself, so that this outgo-
ing and thIs retu:rn, this rtfurn and this oLlt~;oing, are simul-
taneously one and the same. 
llworks of Love, p. 227 • 
................... _-
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This passaee is a perfeot translation of Klerkegaardts dialectio 
toward freedom. It is a translation into life with all the over-
tones of love. If ever ~~lerkegaard employed his dialectio of 
interactinii; relations to explain life, it is here. Perhaps we oan 
reverse the process and use our experience in life to grasp the 
rneanins; of hls dialectic. 
Husband and wife, parent lind child--all these huve exnel"-
ianced love. They know what it is to love and to be loved. They 
see no d:tfCerance between love and an act expressive of that love. 
Where one is found, the ether is expected. A p(3rSOn oannot love 
wlthout aoting out of love, nor can the act procoed from a love 
that 1s absent. As the love grows, so does the expres3ion, and re-
ciprocally, a greater expresse10n creates Ii greater love. This is 
the experienoe oo.mmon to all. And who of these, husband or wit'e, 
parent or oh1ld, who would complain that he or she was not free 1n 
love? Would not eaoh one wil11nr;ly say, "It I am to be free, it 
I am to be what I am and beco;:e what I should be, then I must love 
--
I am bbund to love." 
This is the freedom. found by K,lerkegaard. }I~eelom in this 
context is the cholae of :.leI! when the self chooses to love be-
cause it must love. It,is at once a being (the direotion outward) 
-
and a becoming (the direction inward), because the actual choice, 
as an expression of love, returns to itself in a growth of leve. 
That is why Kierkegaard says that "this oute;,.ing and th1s return, 
this return and this outgoing, are simultaneously one and the 
---
same. It It this love and 1 ts expression do not (~xist. then the man 
woman, Dr ohild, whoever is lacking this love, that person is not 
free, .for he VillS made to love; he was created for love. 
There is 1 i ttle won.JeI' that the dialeotio of love paral-
lels the dialeotic of eternity in time. The actIvity of .;nan pro ... 
ceeds aocording to his nature, and as love 1s a human activity, it 
must resemble man's dialectioal composition of the eternal and te~ 
poral. "Man 1s a synthesis of the infinite and the finIte, of the 
temporal and the eternal, of fre·~dom and neoessi ty. 1112 Thl s is 
man's naturos. and we wl11 understand thJs nature insofar as we un-
derst;Jnd the aotlvity which flows rrom It. Therefore, from what 
has already boen said of the dialectio of' love) we can learn about 
the d1aleotio of eternity 1n tIm.e. 
In the above quotation whioh relates love to eternity, S.K. 
wrote that "when the etel'11al is present 1n fa man, then this 
• 
. ' 
eternalso reduplioates itself in him, that every moment it is pre-
sent 1n him, it is present in & twcfold ~:1anner: in an outwa,l"'d di-
rection, and in an inward direction baok 1nto itself, bl.l.t 1n suoh 
a way that this is one and the same thing) for othemrise it Is not 
duplioation. ff This outws..ro dIrection Is man 's In£'lnl tizatlon of 
himself, that is, h.is im.aGinative reflection on his personal Dart1 .. 
cipation 1n the eter>nal. Sbl1ilarly, the inward direotion 1s man's 
actualIzation or hl.mself, the realization of eternity 1n time. 
l2S1okne •• unto Death. p_ 17. I, ............... ,.
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At this point, the dialectic 1s explicablo through the 
analogy of love. Infinitlzation, the outward direction, is likene 
to the expression of love, while actualization, the inward direc-
t1on, oorrespono& to love Itself. Personal experience has alread:r 
told us that love and its expression are identified in us. and tna 
it is preoisely this relationship of identity that constitutes o~ 
freedom. In like manner, intlnitization and actualization become 
ldentified 1n the self, for it is through this dialectic that the 
self, whioh is a relation, relates itself to its own self. This 
151 freelom. 1'hat 1n the relation which relates itself to itself 
is freedom. 
This reflection revealing to a man what he is at the core 
of his being. this reflection unveiling to a man his potential 
freedom, all this is infinitlzation. That is why the 
dealing with love and eternity is such. a fine example of Kierke-
gaar-dian reflection. This was S.K •• s" method of opening to himself 
the avenue toward freedom. l ) 
According to Klerkegaard, the reflectIve acttvity of ima.gina-
tion should ever be a.pproxima.ting; the perfect expression ot man's 
freedom. In his efforts to achieve this perfect expression, he 
spent much time contemplating Divine Love and its comparison 
13Whi1e treating here ot Klerkegaard t s dialectic, it is In ... 
teresting to note how closely it resembles the Hegelian dialeo-
tic of theSis, antithesiS. and synthesis. Although Kierkegaard's 
entire philosophy is a violent reaotion against Hegel's idealism.. 
we oannot deny that he was strongly influenced by this German 
idealist. as is ev1denoed here. 
r 
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with human love. In his later years, Kierkegaard constantly 
th::nlt';ht of God only under the aspect of love. No doubt, this was 
a natural reaction to his father's puritanioal training which had 
introduced God to him as a God of wrath. \Vhatcver the ca.use. love 
for S.K. beoame the truth of God. We may sa.y that lnfinltlzatlon 
was simply an effort to express the tl'uth of his personal relation 
to God. That is why this radical self-knowledge had to be of him-
self as nothing betore God, yet infinitely under obligation. In 
his disoourse, "Love is a Matter of Consoienoe, II Klerkegaard ex-
presses beautifully this relationship of love between God and manl 
The froe heart has no history; when it renounced itself it 
acquired no history of its love, happy or unhappy. But the 
heart infinitely bound to G:.id has a preoedIng history, and 
therefore it understands that earthly love and friendship are 
but an interlude, a oontl'ibution to thiS, the sole history ot 
love, the fi:rst and the last. You who know how to speak so 
boautIfully about earthly love and friendship, if you under-
stood that these oonstitute only a very little section within 
that eternal history: how bJ?ief:, you ?/ould be compared with 
the brevity of the seotionl Ycu'be,';ln your history with the 
beginning of love and you end w1th a grave. But that eternal 
hIstory of love began far earlier; it began with your begin-
ning, when you came into existence from nothIng, and as truly 
as you do not become nothing, So tX'uly the history does not 
end with the grave. POI' wh(:m the deathbed is prepared for yO\ , 
when you gave F;one to bed, never more to rlse, and thor only 
wai t for JOu to turn to the {}ther slde to d.Le, and thEf,3t1l1-
nesS Grews about you--when gradually the nearer fr1ends go 
away, and the stillness grows because only the Jearest :t~emain 
while death ocmes nearer you; then when the dearest go softly 
away, L'1d the stillness grows, beClluse only ~rour own family 
remain; and when then the last one has bent for the last time 
over you and turns away, for now you turn to the side of dea1b 
there yet remaL'1s One by that side, He the last at the death-
bed, Re who was the f1rst, God the living God--lt for the4res your heart was pure, which it became only by loving Him.l 
• d I 
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In this !>;;~ssage S. K. has rnirrored love according to the 
phenomenology of Inflnltization. He has expressed himself and all 
nen as loved by C~d. This is truth; it is self-knowle,dge. and 
therefore it 1s infinit1zatlon. 
We oannot help but wonder as we read such a pas;Jage what 
factors in his life enabled him, to feel so poignantly the truth 
of love. To express philosophy and theology In sueh a way is a 
h:1.f..:;h degree of pe.t"sonalism. 'llhat is why we VH'ota in our Introduo-
tlon that to undel"stand the :uan is to understand his work. So ve 
much of this passaGe deepens in moanin,; when VI e reflect upon 
Kierkegaard t II love tOl" his i'ather "hleh culminated 1n pain. and 
love for RCilgine which endQd in SOl~l:">OW. His experience with hu!aan 
love Vias t.otally unlike that of the eorumon man. It Vias as unlike 
as Kiorkegaard himself was unlike tr16 C ottunon man. 
Yet, this pain, sorrow, anti frustration did not crush his 
• 
" 
love a.nd embitter him as it might h,~ve. On the contrary, his love 
became purified. Tho ~p1ri tual in him beCamf) aooentuated over the 
material. But this, in no way lessening the sorrow, only served 
to augment the pain. Reflection tauf":pt him that this pain, in 
spi to of' 1 ts cruelty, or peri:w.ps because of 1 ts cruelty, is love. 
tl'hus he wr:l'tas in his book Trainin7 in Christianity: 
r 1 .......... J"", 
It is always painful to have to hide a heart-felt emotion and 
to seem to be other than one is--sueh is the oase in a merely 
huutan relationship. Of ldl hU;:"lt2.n suffering :Lt is the h:Ell~dest 
to bear, and he who suffers thus, suffers, a.las, more in one 
day tban by vll bodily tortu.res talten tOI~,,;ether. I do not pre 
Burne to decIde whether such collisions &ctually occur, or 
whether a. man who experiences suah a col11sion does nit also 
r--------------------73~ 
sin every instant he !~f.Hlv:~1ns in 1t--I SPEH:lk only of the SUt'fEUIi-
ing. The col115.ion is that out of love for another one must 
hide a heart-felt emotion and seem to be other than one la. 
The pains a.l."S purely of the soul, and they are as c omposi to 
as theS' possibly can be. But it is t'ar from beine a good 
thing that s. pa1n 113 composite, for with evec>y new combinatio) 
it acquires an additional sting. The painfulness of this ex-
perience lies first in onets cwn surfering; for it is blessed 
to belong to another tn the perfect underatandins or love or 
t'riendship, it is painf'ul to keep to oneself this inwardness 
of .feeling. In the next pl ace 1 t is Bufferin:? on account of 
the other; for that ~hich in re~11ty is the solicitude of 
love. or a love whioh 1. S Vlillinc:; to do anything, eV'.m to sac-
rifioe life for the other, finds 0xoresslon here in someth1ng 
wh1ch has a d1."eadf'Ul151keness to the supremest cruel t~ ..... ah,· and yet it was lovel 
We need no further qroot or Klerkegaard's psychological 
genius. ,Blrom what j',e know of hls l:tfe, wa can correctly induce 
that tIlls genius f~rew from an introspection of his personal expert .. 
onoe. J~ claims not to Dresume to decide whether or not such 001-
11sions actually occur, but thIs is nothing more than a weak eftor1 
to avoid self-revelation. His p.r-evious life gives the lie to his 
words. Yet, even 1f we knew nothing Qt his life, it ia evident tm 
no one could write that way about suft'ering without having experi ... 
enced it first. This i:3 ne,t only a df.)ep expression of Kierke .... 
gaard t s pe:l"sona~ist phl1o:;o.phy. More than that, it is great 
literature, for he has captured a truth tha.t is universal to ;n.an, 
and he t:t::S expraast..d it in a beautirul manner. 
Klerkegaard was well acquainted with the inner pa1n that he 
ddscribes in the Hbove passage. As the:"e s. re strong, melancholic 
overtones to his words, so too there were strong, melancholic over-
15Training in Chrlstlanitx, PP. 1)6-137. 
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tones to his life. In 1839, just betore his engsgement to Regine, 
he wrote: "I oan sa.y of my sorrow 'ii'hat the J3nglish:nan says or 
his house: 16 my sorrow is my eustle." By sayln~; this. he dId not 
mean to in'::Iicate that his 111"'e was ens of aesthettoal melancholy. 
Earl ler, be :.1[i<1 distinguished between sorrow and 1'l/;)lanOh01y.17 
!?eraon <.:irrliated ~l th w~18noholy oa.nnot find 8. oure beaause he 
no idea what 1s causing his moodln~s8. This is parauoxioal, for 
the cause is wi thin himself, and only sal r ... knowled~e can 1ll'Hld to a 
recovery from this slo1mess. On the other hand, the man in sorrow 
is perteetly aware of its cause. If' it is within h1s f>ower to re .... 
move t!le oause, he may do so, but the oause often turns out to be 
Divine Governanee, and no one oan remove this frOM his life. 
S.K. felt that Governance was the cause of his own aor~ow. 
After he broke his engagement with Reglne, he wrote: "When God 
wishes to bind a. mun to him. he calls~ his most faithful se:MTant, 
most trustworthy messenger, and it is" sorrow, and says to himlhas 
en after him, overtake him. do not leave his side (and no 
attach herself more closely to the man she loves than so1'1'ow.)"18 
His love led to sorrow, and his sorrow led to love. Vfuen the 
cyole was complete, Klerkegaard found that his ori?;inal love 
was now purified. Wha1j o':d been dependenoe upon human love was no 
16 
,:-!.o.urnals, p. 73. 
l7E1 tho,r/£!:. II, p. 159. 
l8J'o~rnals, p. 103 • 
.. 
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sublimated to a dependence upon Divine Love and independenoe of 
human... (; .K. t a love had un(leri.~one a total change of 6:'1;::>hasls. In 
the i'irst instance, the 6J1'lphasls had boon on the object loved, now 
1 t wa::.{ on thli'~j::'irnacy of the .need to 10ve.19 Kierkegaard had. 
aC~1j_cved t~lO knowled~;;e ,Jr himsel.f' a s a be :tn?; made for love.. 1 .. 0V6 
-,las in hl. s nD.t:.lre.. Tht s d,l I3CGve ry cf inner wealth ','lnS the "reduct 
of inflnitiza~ion, for the dlso:.'very of this treasure r.vas possible 
only throi.l.~rh the means of imaginative C";flection. 
Let us view one more exp~e3s1on of KierkeIaardian reflec-
cion, this t1C;10 his lnfin! ttzation of self in hope. Hope is the 
virtue that fights against the despair of necessity. Hope is the 
cry of possibility when all posslbl1i ty seems vain. In a di:3cours 
entitled, "Love Hopeth all Thinf:3," S.K. counselled: "Nevor un ... 
l(.;v1r~;::ly,-,ive up any man or your hope for him, Cor it mi:?;ht be pos 
sible t:lat even the most prodigal s~n might still be saved; that 
" the most bitter enemy, a.las, he was waa your friend, i.t 1s posslbl 
tha.t he micht again beoome your friendJ it is possible that he \.,ho 
sank lc'tlost, just because he ha.d 3tood so high, it is still po~nl­
ble that he might again be 11ft~d up; it 1s still possible that th 
love which grew cold, might attain be fanned into 1'l&r:1e: therefore 
nev,"Jr give up !lny man, not even at the 151st moment; do net despair 
rather hope all thlngsl,,20 
19Works of Love, p. 56 • 
....... ,;;;,,;;;;; .... ,- ................. 
20Ibid., p. 205. 
-
r 
tnz 
t.lzed ea0h ouo cf tiW30 in his ' .. :wn mind. lie looked 10 
at hi3 own Jhado~ Qust by t~~ 11~hts of infinite levD, paIn, and 
hopG. I-EH oorlatunt reflection upon 11':'3 l"elatlonsillp to God brough 
him to a lC1cwldd:~G of his .tnne.!." be1.ng, but -this :cef1eation was not 
t;llG pu:::. ... ~o,Je of his exLltenee. Inflnit17ution is but one ll!O!.1.ent in 
dialectical freeci~.nn. ,l.nci to :.solnte oneself in thIs rtlOm.ent alone 
is to fa.ll Into the Jespalp of possl.biliJ~y. 
The Danger of Reflection 
The dangel" of 1"'o£leo tion 1s thaI; al though it is knowledge 
of the ~elf, ii:; i;;J nut tile self. To stop with reflection 1s to 
lose the .;;'.olf. To s·top wi l;h J:'eflection is to .fail to relate the 
self to itself'. to fail to o..)CQUl€; froe. A '~J.an C~;l.n knew himself <1S 
nothiu~: be.lOl"'6 Clod, lnf'in;;' tely unde.::- ~ obligation, but If' ho 
• 
fails t 
act on ·thi.s self-knowled;.;e. the knov!lled,;~ is vHin. 
l1'r10 dlstluGtion 1s tile same as that between thoucht and 
aotion. It is quite possible that a man XI1i~';;ht stop ;·:;f't; .. H' the for ... 
was 1.' lentloss 1n his a.ccusation G;gainst his contemporaries for 
a nominal stt.; to wi thin society led hLn to a bi tter~ one ... c;an attack 
war's the result of the "personal vooation" [2.i ven him by L"-od to 
direct mon b&ck to true Chrlsti~nlty. 
r 
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!1 ~1e£,1 cction Is r:c:t the evil; but Ii reflect! v€ conai tion ~nd th.e 
y::: ... ·eccde !lotion :!.nto n rne,~n8 cf escape fl"om Bction, is both eorrupt 
e retrorrade 
'-' 
21 
movement ... 
To ::Itor: ':::1 th ;Jure I'eflectlon is tC) miss the PU!'DOSO of 1 ::'fe, for 
"of WL.a t use then isreal! ty if' by imaglna t10n one were ob1c wi til 
complete u.ctuality to ~:,oncelve it 1n ~"dvance, of '.viHat use t{:6 seVelI 
ty years if 1n hIs twenty-second yea.r a man could experience every .. 
thingl n22 
rr'hls rem.ote I'efleotion, according to Klc:::'keF;aar~l, had gone 
beyond the Ind1. vi(~uel and ha.d infected. the soolo9.1 thou;::';ht in 
Denmarl-c. It wa~~ nc 10nS8:> e. pe;;>scnal problem .. but hHd becct:~e so-
c lal. '('o.ch m.an "finds h: mself in the vast pri son formed by the 
reflection of thane around him, for be:::a.uso of his :.'olaticn tc his 
• 
cwn refloc~.:on he 61.1so .b.as a certain relation to the refleotion 
around hira. He can only escape fl"Om. this 2Dcon:~. imrl1?isorunent 
thrau;):1. the inwtli"dne!H, Q!" l'e11:3:10n, no mattel" how clearly he may 
pCl'ceivo the falsoness cf thin rclut1onsrl1.p ... 23 
Only religion would enablo a r-;an to bl'OI.\k loose from the 
21Spren .Klerkegaul~~J.. '}'ho P:;.'(lS0nt A{-;e and !!!2 Minor Ethico-
Rel15~iOUS Treatises, tr. ATexandel' !Sru and Vial tel:' Lowrie (Lon~on .. 
!9Ii<J " 'P. ~8. ' . 
22Truinins !!! Chri~t1anl tIt p. 186. 
23T~).r' P"""""e"lt ABe p ::>") 4'.. ',,-,0 .... ; ".... • I,._t.. ... 
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socially D,~cepted f:md "conceited nctton tr:at the pozst~:tlttil of 1"'0" 
flection :ts far :::lUpCr10r to C :Y~:,re decis:ton."24 \~;hile every'body 
elBG contented hJ~Belf with t~e th~u~ht th~t freedom ~on$19ts in 
ly convinc~1 that true fr~edom was the actual becom10: cf ~elr ae~ 
deter:l1inaticn of :::elf in the will instead of in the inla·~i:'"Jat1cn. 
In th.e final analysls, 1t 5.5 the will 'IIrhich ~cs t~e ceci::;lve factor 
deterr.:.in:1nt: '?!but man will be. 25 Tht~ i:1:Si;~:ination is necessary to 
p!:"oposc the: possibility of self to man':3 con:JC':!;JuSn~"s3, but It is 
the will which ~hooees to ~e that self. 
This choice of self by the ~ill radically involves the ac-
tual sufferinp.:s cf r'csll ty, for :!. t is precisely tb-rOt'tfh tuffering 
that ::;:,;.n w:~'I'ks ot;,t h.i.s snl vnticn. It 1s thI'0t'1.7J~. sUffcr1nc' th:lt 
he form!:: himself /}ccC'rdlng to the Pst.tern, Christ. ':;'penk1u". cf the 
Bufforin:s of life, ~.K. saye! 
ca.nnot repder--in f;::,ct 1 t cap.Ilot be renjerej., 1 t c;:n only t)e, and 
-
h'en"l'.> ~ t i'~ th .,. t • \.. e ..... " c+ n I'0. .r'f ,.., '·rf""ct" .... n ¢:'1. <'I ~_l'"" a:.Yin"'tir.'n 'p"e::l""nt'" ~.l..' .. "",,_ A. ~...... _""'_ wI..... J._, J. (J,,~ ~~ '"" ,.".~. "..'; J .. \'~', ...... _l~" c;:r. .e. v,~ ~
it always looks so easy, so persuasive." 26 
Reflection, then, is as dunL::ercu3 r~.s it is nc'oessar:r. 
ThI'cur~h rofleotion, the :.::If L'li<:ines 1 t2 possible s elf', but it 111m 
21~Ibld. 
-
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r'3.11 int'J JC:lspair unles.'J it I'Dl ... te3 ltzcl.f' to~_t~l~lf thro~.1=h 
actualization. ~9 now turn to ~lat Klarke~aqrd ~enns by "actual1-
zatlon". 
r 
CHAPTER IV 
DJ'IAL:.CTICAL FREED~)~Jf 
Perhaps Kierkegaard's major contribution to modern exis-
tential philosophy 1s his doctrine of' actualization, or, as it is 
more comrnonly tanned, "becominG" _ For S.K., actualization deals-
pates both the process of becoming oneself and the degree of self-
~ttainment_ This view of man emphasizes the temporality of his 
s1 tuation, the spatlal-tern:".Joral c'vent of human perfectlnG_ (jonse-
Ruently, S.K. eVBrts the Ar.i .. stotelian notions of act, potency, and 
~f:)cessl ty, whe:r>ein a fint te being composed of act Hnd potency pos-
sesses factual necessity. In thnt framework, nece:::sity was a syn-
\01 . 
ontrary t9 this, Kiarkegaard t $ develop~ 
rtent of existential temporal! ty consi<ier's /lct as a synthesis of pas ~ 
sibll1ty and necessity. 
As v.'O have ",clx-eady seen, necessity is the third term in the 
dex-ived synthesiS between infinity and finitude, This synthesis 
~s necessary because !<la.n discovers himself in this 51 tuation with-
but oi thEn- willing or desiring 1 t. After 1'1ndln~i, himself thus 
given in croation, man's Im8:.:;inatlve I'sflectlon reveals his esscn-
tial posslbll1 ty. Posaibl11 ty :ts the terminal point in the prooess 
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')f ;'lE:CE'; S;.; i ty 1:!.!'ld. "i')nS3 ibl11 ty I U~e ta.sk of ti ':Ie 1s to un'. to those 
1 ement::: into actu,nli tj.". A '11~n cr.;;nnct chAne;e hi3~:t 'len 'last, fol' 
In tb3 i'ut'),r6. ?ust an; f'ntarc bee 'me 1nvol ved in the~;pe .sent a.s 
actuullz&tion Is ~ynt~estzod from possibility and necesslty.l 
'1':'113 vlew of ~nan a 3 e. ton:::cl~al synthesis cxplelns how seem-
:nrly di ~~ junct.l 'Ie :":C tto:~ S '1uch a.s sel :: ... ncc6ptnnce nnd c0.!1.ttnual 
that a :'lan 1:::1 perfectly all r>i')lt an he is, but rather that he 
seas his PISt as a ~iven, factual noccsslty, and insofar as this 
past 18 lncorp(Jrated lnto the lrrunad1acy 01' the -r:n"csent, he cannot 
chan1!o 'Nha.t he i:3. H-ts accopt.9.:.1C'I) 01"' self t s based on God's acoep-
tanco of hJm. Man is n,;,cessarily u sinner, o.nd God accepts the 
neceSS8.:i?Y in m.an. HO'llev~n~J any part1cular personal sin 1s not 
necessai:'y, far man jQlnn sin to 115.s beins in the process of Q,ctual· 
ization. This third term between possibility and necesrlity 1.s not 
a der:'.ved unity, but is created by ;:;).an himself throu/I-h free choice 
lfhus, al though mnn 1s not res:)Onsi ble for being a. sin.tJ.er, he 1s 
still nil tv" of his ;)\m sln. 1\.lonr:~.ije hi s duty to ,')c,cept self, he 
ts placod under the Dt.rlct obligation of continual repontance. 
1'1'1'11.S formula .for actU3l1zatlon 1s further explained by 
Jeor-fe Malantsohuk in his article "rIa Dlalootlqu3 de Is. Llberte' 
selon S/>ren Kierkega~.rd.» Revue des Sciences Ph11osoghlg,ues et Th~ oloi~io.u,es, XIJ!I (1958), traduotion <1u danols par ~.orette;O.?" 
pp. llr=125. 
r 
--------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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Aotualization may a1d us to understand these other notions, 
but the purpose of this chapter is to obtain a deeper knowledge ot" 
actualization itself. We have already seen that it consists in the 
praotical activity resulting from a manta consoiousness that he is 
befoz'a God as a sinner, as nothing, and 1n absolute obedience. 
Further explanation revealed that the proportion between infinitl-
zation and actualization paralleled the proportion between thought 
and a etion. 
Klerkeg&brd gen{~rallY' managed to refrain from any expli-
cit statement ooncerning the meaning of practioal activity. How-
ev~n-'J from what has been Baid about the actual sufferings of life, 
it would seem. that he does not relegate aotion to man's conscious-
ness of self through inflnitization. Action is more than thou~~t, 
and therefore we c&nnot pe~torm an action by talk1ng about it or 
viewing it as H pos:iJ..bil1ty, but onll~ by doinG it. Action is e. 
.fc'rm of existence, and as existence cannot be oonoeptualized, but 
only judged, so too, a man cannot sal aotion, but can only 10 it. 
This tact tbat actualIzation cannot be fulfilled through thought 
oxplains why S.K. eould not apply hIs phenomenolo:;:;:lcal method to it 
ii.otuallty is not a phenomenon for contemplation. 
It' actualIzation is truly more than mere consciousness and 
acceptance of self, then S.K. hns stepped beyond the Lutheranism 
of his day. Yet:t t is co!.1lt'l1only aeimowled;:ed that Klerkei;aard was 
a staunch follower of Luther. May we advance here Ii possible 
tnz 
8,3. 
~olution for th1s seeming cQntradlotion? It is not imp~obable that 
~ierkegaard'8 purltanioallynroteatant upbringing kept him a st:rong 
~upporter of Lutheranism till his early death in 1855. He was par-
~icularly sympathetic with Luther's revolutlona~y attacks against 
~he status quo of organized Christianity. Yet S.K.ts keen in~ight 
, 
~nto life helped him to realize that i:'!lan' 8 task of perfeeting his 
)elng makes morally ~ood acts a necessary complement of faith. 
Dnly throut~ a union of the two may man purchase freedom. 
This e~planatlon may be t~ue as far as it goes, but it is 
an inadequate e~1lanation of Klerkegaardts writings. The problem 
'Jf fa! th and good works reeul"S tirne after time in the l-eliglo11s 
wo~ks, and faith 1s often repl"esented as the sole condition for 
aotualization. To resolve this difficulty, we must examine what 
f).K. understood by the t'Jrm "fal th". 
FaIth and Good Works 
The degree of Luther's influence on Kierkegaard rnay be de-
bated. 2 and this ia particularly true regazadlng this problem ot 
raith and good workS.) Luther espoused the suff'ielency of faith 
2Por a brief discussion on the various opinions of Luther'. 
~nfluence on 3.K., cf. t!- Heywood Thomas, SubJectivity!.!l1 Paradox 
(New York, 1951), pp. 48-$0. 
3I do not pretend to discuss the subtleties of this theo-
~o2~ieal pl"oblem in th'i s thesis. However, S.K. uses the term "tal tl'f 
~n an unusual sense, and we must he aware of this in c,rder to un-
~erst;~nd the relationship between faith and actualization. 
for salvation, and admonished his followers to sin bravely pro-
vided they ::ielieved more firmly. Sin and fal th w ere;ui ta compat-
ible for Luther. Kierkegaard, on the contrary, would be compelle4 
logically to deny the possib11ity of suoh oompatibility, for he not 
only taught 'tihe synonymity of "despair" .and "sin" as we saw above,~ 
but he also definitively identified freEd.>m and be11ef. The same 
formula for the condition 1n which no despair at all exists 1s alae 
the formula for believing: by relating itself to its own self, and 
by willing to be itself, the self 1s grounded transparently in the 
Power whioh constituted it.5 Inasmuoh as despair is a dispropor-
tion in the self, it is a. negation of fre~Jdom., and S.K. would con-
vey an identical meaning by stating that sin is the negation ot 
" 
belief. The ,two are contradictories, and therefore carulot posslbll 
be compatible with each other. Consequently, it would be an absurd~ 
ity for S .. K. to 8a:/, "Sin bIJ8.vely but:: believe more firmly. '* On thLI 
point at least, he must assume a pOSition ot oounte:r-dlstinctlon 
to Luther. 
·1£ we note that actualization and believing are both proces-
ses whose terms &1:'e identified in freedom, we m.ay ar;ue back to 
the identifioation of the prooo0sses themselves. Actualization, tox 
S"K •• 1s believing,. Does this mean that actualization is narrowed 
to what ,.ve ordlnurI1y mean by "fai tn, It or is fal th expanded to new 
4c~. above, pp. 56-59-
5Sickness ~ Death, pp. 77-78. 
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dimensions by Klerkeguard? 
It is not surprising to discover various Kierkogaardlan 
dofiinitions of faith 1n different oontexts, nor oan we expect eas:!J;j 
to cO!Jlprehend thcse definitions at first reading. "Pal th, ft S.K. 
journalized, ftis an inflni te self-!:l.9.de care as to v/oether one has 
/ 
f'aith--and that self-mude care is :raith. uo He wrote this In 1848, 
the same ysa.r in wh1ch he composed Siokness unto Death, and we find 
I ................. 
here a unity in his thou:":~ht. This care for faith is the effort of 
man to attain se1fhood in Christian sobriety, and it is self-made 
because freedom is not a derived synthesis, but is selr-m~de 1n the 
process of actualization. Faith is taken here as both the term and 
IProoess. It Is the goal of Christian perfection and the attaining 
of that goal. it 1s actua.llza.f~ion and actualizing. Man attains 
this goal of faith. precisely inasmuch as he strives for it by be-
lieving, 
This un! ty between the term and I)'rOOess of fal th exactly 
!parallels Klerkegaal'd's trea.tment of love that we saw in the Drav!. 
ous ohapter. The axpl"esslon of love is its very "ct. What love 
does, that it is; what it is, that it dces--and at one and t he same 
time: at the very moment it goes out of itself, it is 1n itself; 
and at the very mom.ent it is in itself', it thel"eby ;:;oes out of it ... 
self. So too with the J.ialeot Ie of fai th, Kierkegaard is more 
86 
concel'"nod with the union of a power with its operation than with 
their distinction. 
Over and above this union between process and term, 8.1(. 
sou;:;ht a.n even higher unity wi thin the un! ty of man, and he found 
n union between faith and love. Jean Wahl points out that Kierke-
gaard ldentified the domain of love with the domain of faith, be-, 
cause all love is a reccgnl tlon of the "thou" and the "I". God 
is the a.bsolute "Thou", and so the d.omain of love Is grounded in 
a recog,nition of GOd; but lithia ca.n only occur in faith. Then he 
prooeeds to show th~lt B.1\.. did not consider love to be an interior 
disposition, but that he identified love with the "vorks of lovEn 
that is., he identified the UGt of' love with love's expl"ession. An 
interior sentiment 1s the aesthetic definition of love; 'but the 
Christian definition is the concrete expres~lon of love in good 
deeds.7 This again explains why Kie~lce;:;aard could not advocate 
" 
" faith without good deeds, for the two are identified as act and 
expression. The aotuality of faith automatically involves the 
reality of good deeds. 8 
Kio.rkegaard's explanation of faith wl11 remain ever mysterl-
7 ,Y Jean Wahl, Etudes Klerko5aardlennes, 2nd ad. (Parls, 1949), 
pp. 304-307. ,. 
8p01" further discussions on this pOint, cf. James Collins, 
The Mind of Kierk6faard (Chicago, 1953), Pp. 208-240; or RegiS 
Jo!ivet,' rntroCluo£~on i Klerke&8.;lrd (Abbaye s. ',landriIle, 1946), 
pp. 221-2~2. .-
... 
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ous to us unless we understand oneflnlll point. For S.K., faith 
is rnc)ro properly El.n net of the will than an :.lot 'Ot tho intelleot. 
This was no phIlosophIcal conclll.s1on from lo:;lcal or psycho;togioal 
rea.sonin~~J but a theoloc~c3l p021 tion that he ~:;ull'dd from Saored 
;:,cripture. As eu:r>ly as 1834, when he was but twenty-one Y0ars 
old, he 'UJl.'lIote: "Fa1th, sur'ely, implies an act of the will, and 
moreo vel" not in the same sense ,1S when I say, for insta.nce, that 
all apprehension lmpliEls an aot of the will; how oan I otherwise 
explain the saying in the New lJ.1estament that whatsoever is not ot 
.faith is sin. (H.orn. xiv, 23),,9 
This scriptLl.ral interpretation by Kierkegaard cannot be 
overestimated. It totally revamps the (;rdillal~Y notion of faith, 
which is usually aoknowledged to:;e an act of the intellect. The 
will may be an efficient C.!l1.13e of this intellectunl uet because 
the evidence or the known object 1.3 not present to the mind to 
" 
" 
com.pel assent. but the a.ct itself belongs to the intellectual power 
of the sOlll. 3.K. re jected this lllUl ted deflni tion of fai th, and 
expanded the horizons of belief until they were ooextensive with 
the entire urea of Christian Derfeotion. Faith became the humble 
reotttude cf w111 as it conforms .itself in obedienoe to the will of 
God. No longeI' is faith a 3lni~;le unt t of' virtue, but it is tl1e 
!perfeotion syntheslzed from the tctality of a mants virtues • 
L 
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stanti.atcd b~l t':o follow ,')':··sOfll.ge tal,.-c·n f'·o,'" 'nl" l.Jonclu·~li'''~' tJn-~ ... ~ F u... ...., .,.~ _. "<' lLli;i _ 
soientific Postsoript: 
Let LtS take a religious uotion. Is believing God identioal 
wi. th considerin,; how glorious a thtng fal th ls, and wb.at peao. 
and sufety it oan elva? By no means. Even wi,shin3 t9, beli_.." 
where the interest of' the subJeot is much more d:eftnlte!f fn ... 
volved;1s not believl~ l! !l2i ~Ctfqq:- 1fie relatlonsh p-
of the Inchvtaual to t i16 action represented 1n his ·thought, 1: 
still merely a possibility, subject to repudiation •••• 
Between the t3.ctlon as l"epresented in thought on the one 
hand, and the 1"ea1 action on the other, between the possibil-
i ty and the reB,li tYt thcl:"e may in respect of content be no 
difference nt:. all. But in respect of form., the difference 
is essential. Reality is the. interest in <lotion, in axis ... 
tenee. lO 
This passa~:;e s~lOuld remove flny 11ng€!'ing doubts about ICierkegaard' f 
identification or fa! th and action, or of fai th and E;cod works. 
Inte.rslty of Choice 
.' 
If fai th 4S Chr1st1an perfectIon pertains to the \"1111, it 
is easy to see wb,y the .qct of choice is centro.l to S.K.' s philO-
sophy ot ~an. Freedom to cheose is not dialectioal freedom, but 
choioe is the tinal step by which a man becomos himself, and there .. 
fers it Is the road to freedom. S.K. has been aocused ot being 
anti-intellectual, but this is not the ease. IUs emphasis on the 
will was merely an effort to attack a contemporary weakness in so-
clety. Infinitlzatlon is the fIrst determinant of a mants self, 
lOconoludins; Unsoientific Postscript, o. 304. (emphasis 
added) 
r 
and thin is certainly intell"ottlul activitY', but it is the w111 
which is decisive. Without the will, a. mont s self is sv:allowod up 
in B gnaWing reflection. 
Tho first Clot of choice in !', rnan t S experienoe. what S.K. 
re:f'ers to as the haptism of the 1.".'111, 1s the absolute l.~ho1ce of 
self. A raa.n J"ecoGn:Lzcs the in.l.epC1'ldence of his sp! ri t and his 
rl~~l:t tv self expression. He decides to centrol hIs actions throue 
h1s will :eathcr than submit them to the control of a.esthetical 
pleasure. This is t:16 absolute e holea of self, the choice to be 
hls self.ll 
We must note here that thIs in:!.tial :holce of self which 
ma.kes man free d06s not convey unrestricted freedom. No, man 15 
still a sinner ;'Jefo:P6 God. r:lol"kcgaard tolls us that the one thine 
fr'om which he was nevisr entirely free even fox' a day \'8.3 his melan-
choly natu,re.12 This highlights the~ pure notion of Klerkegaardian 
• 
freedom whioh 1s rlOt unrestricted liberty nor freedom of oh010e. 
but ra theT' :t t :1 s the becomin,-; ()f' self; 1 t is the s elf which hus 
beoome itself. This does not Illettn that :'nan oreates himself' or-
breaJts tho l'),mris of stn wh1.ch, according to R.I{. f s Luthernn5.sm, 
't 
are 9ar.*t and parcel of man l s COl"l"Upt nature. It Simply means that 
man re ... orHate~3 hiraAelf by accept~~ng himself a~,) he is, a Sinner, 
11~lth~r/Q£J II, p. 179. 
12The Point £!~. p. 78. 
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while at the same t imc holdln;r. before himself the Inf"inl te hope 
of God's .f'oI'n'lveness. Thin acceptance of self is thelbsolute 
choice of self .. 
In this baptism of the vd.ll a.nd in all subsequent will 
acts, S.K. stresses tho intensity lnvolved. Tho objectiv~ good-
ness of an Hot is net the ul tirtllOlte doterminant of Christia.n sobrle .. 
ty. In the final analysis, it is intensity, enthu.slasm, or purity 
of intention that is decisive. Just as stn 1s in the will ~athe~ 
than 1n the object. the sumo 1s true of perfcetton, a.nd S.K. empha"'1 
sized thls <"lven to the point ()f jeopardizing an objective moral 
code.. He cons Idered himself a spirt tual leader whose mL;;, sion was 
to combat contemporal'Y deficiencies, and he believed t:.-ia't the 
hI indspots of the [;1;-'e were in the area of fundamental principles. 
He tau;~ht that man must ra-cognlze h::'mself as a creatur-8 whose be-
:1nrc: is Immettsed in the power of God, .:as a creature dependent u.pon 
• 
God in hope, love, and faith. Kierkegi!lard saw the fruitlessness 01 
doing the ri;:;ht thing for the wrong rea:H)U, and so he did not at-
tempt to nrench a :-Ipocial eth1.oal and relL.;lous code b(;)fore he had 
rointrod!wed into society an acceptance cf :[eneral pr:!.nclplos.l) 
He tr-led to lead men to the personal consciousness of self through 
inflni tL".8tion, and then ind.icate to them the freedcm to be IJchiew. 
tr r 
13Because of the severance of Protestantism from. nome, S.K. 
woulci. pI'obably novel'" have developed a speoial ethic, except for 
a man exit:;tin§T in the ethl.cRl sphere. f::'.K. beli.eved that the rell-
;.:::ious spi:lel"o was too much of a personal eOnl.mlt;jnent to God to be 
invclved 1n an objective, unlver.'Jo.l oode of rnc'rallty. 
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In actualization. 
'~rhis dialectio tDwar(l freedom In man 1.9 not simply a hup-
h::1.zo.rd fOI'cin~; tor;ether of' C'ontrt.tdlotories. Aotual:i.za't,lon or 
self :lh01111 be a natural sequent of inflni tizati::m, or 1n other 
words, there shoUld be a dlrect ryroportlon betVtcen intenntty of 
choice anr-~ ccr:.scio'umess of sel!.... In the act 0'[oh010e, vlhich ot 
i taolf :i1.nkes man {'reG, the clement of depth ia detormined by in-
tenSity, intensity 1n turn being determinod by the degree of oon-
sciousnesa. ThL3 is wh'lt S.K. means when he says that the f1zost 
cond1 tl:::m :leterrnininr:" what :;10.n will turn out to be Is imagination, 
even thou.gh it is the \'1111 that ultirnately makes the cholce. 14 
Within these degrees of' ~C'nsclo',.l~~ness, inten:.1!.ty, and freedom, the 
~uprel":1e p':rf,;ction c.bides in the t'1nn tvho has truly becomo a Chztls-
t:tan. Christian sobriety supposes tetal eonsc1ouane5s of selt as 
ordered to Ood; faith 1.5 the etemal "~nthus1asm which attains the 
peak of intensitr; and finally, perfect freedom is the Christ1an 
eteronal1y united to G(,d 1n love. 
Dialeotical Freedom 
Tho more we ponder these ideas cf dia.lectioal freedom, the 
more sharply \.,e rceltze that they completely evert our cOl'l1'nonl~ 
acce;.>ted definition!': of freedom. We hBve said, "God makes man 
tree)" Kierkegaard teaches: ,"God gives man potential rreedom.~ w. 
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have sHid, "Freedom is the ability to choose for yourself;" 
Kierkogaard w'rltes, "Freedom t3 the solitary choice of God whioh HE 
Himself cOInnw.nda. tt We have sold, "Man possesses .freedom; tt Kierke-
gaardc",roclalms: ";\lan is freec.orn." This is confusing, for when we 
retI!'aee Ol1r thouc;hts :In an effort to track down the s)urce of dis-
ae;reement, we only find that personal 61tperlence corrobOr!~teB what 
~1.K. has sald. True, we must stand firm against the autonomy he 
eives to man ln othioal and religious matters, but this does not 
affeot the truth or his psycholocioal explorations into man. Why, 
then, this disa~reement? In largo part, it may be due to the faot 
that. we use the same term to discuss many o:1stinct realities. 
"Freedom" is an analogous term. We Bay that the robin in the air 
is free; the nanthe:' freely roams the rorest; man freely chooses; 
and God is free to oreate. Consequently, in ordor to understand 
freedom in 1 ts purl ty .. many philosoph:ers abstract it fl"om the 1m--
perfeotions \'.hich restrict l.ts perfection in limited beinf!. When 
this purifiBd notion 1s predioated of man, the danger 1s present 
of forgettine; t:1.at man i~3 first n creature, and only then free. 
KiArkega.ar·::l developed Ii method of approach that did not 
involve abstraction and purifioation of the attributes in man. Mal 
is studied as the whole man living and breathinG in reality; as 
man Iovine: and mfln hating; man w(;rking and man resting. The only 
proal' Kierkegaard could advance for his thesis was an appeal to 
personal experience. All th:i.s plus his Lutheran tenets oaused his 
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intollc)ci.:nn1 Shtdy <':;0 be: nore closely aldn to theolog-J than to 
30d-man relntionsh:tp WfJS nl,:)t f' conclusion to be reachod, but an i1"" 
DOl1filt ty. He bel:i.oved tb::~t thl'tOUCh croation man is bound to God 
wi th the stroncest cf' ties. Man i.s undOl" absolute cOl1iuand to orda! 
a1, In. what; senae then could :nan be 
suid to be free? Certainly he is not f'ree to choose. for he j.s 
co'u,;anded to c11003e Cod. Yet, Klc:::>keguard know throuGh faith tha.t 
1l11an.1EL.. .free.15 Wl:lat 1s t!1ore, he sen:::ed freedom within hla own be-
inE. just as truly (J.:J he :Jer-iodically experienced Vlha. t he t armed a. 
loss Dr freedom. :':~o, with exper:tence lIS the r:iHterinl and 11:.8 psy .... 
,. 
cholo:,ical UttStcZ'y ci.S a tool, he set cut to fashion f'roeio:.:. 
ThOtlC ideas about th!C fx-cedon of a crea.ted human pcr!.lon al"'e 
best expr'cssed in the Works of LOITe. :. The r!lotif of love enables 
......................... 
c1l€iI'ity is freedom, and freedom :.5 cha<rlty~ This theme brinGS 
abcut a clar>ificat;ion of freedom, for what is obscure in our un-
de:rstand:tttg of freedom becomes lucid thrcugh our experience of 
love. 'rhus Kiorkegatu'd wr'~ tas: "Only whon i t ~.s a duty to love. 
only then is love e'llE':rlo.stin:'ly free In bles:Jed Independence, rt16 
15certalnly S.K. was aware of the distinction between phys1-
cal and mcral freedom. jt"rom what has already been said. 1 t 1s 
clea.r that he W~J:3 stri v in,:: to unde rstand another facet of man's 
reality. What happens when man creates himself? 
16Works of Lov~. p. 32. 
9,'1· 
Is it nat true that the ve!'y person who feels a compulsion 
in his love, the '1ian driven to love from his very !:'ein:::, he is 
t'-1e n;a.n who feels free in his love? HAnd just the O1".e who feels 
hh.1self so dependent en hI s love t;;Ii.it ~e w '0;:\1 d lose everything in 
lcs1n7 the beloved, just he Is indenendent--on the condition that 
he does not confuse love with ?ossession of the beloved. The love 
that und(:n~'Nent the ohan~);e cf eternity by 'Je(~omin.:; duty, and )ove$ 
l~ecaLlse it must love, it i3 independent, for the only one it is 
dependent upon is duty, and duty '1.8 the onl] cmancipatinf power. 
Duty ''lc-:kes a r'1&n d.ependent and at the same th18 eternally ll.ldepen ..... 
dent. ttl7 30 otten we sre deceived as to what J3 de'0endence and 
.,.,ha.t tndependence in love 'It ;3." K. rGal:!. zed that free·1om in love eon-
ststs :1.n belne able to continue lovtng oven when the othc:::' ;11.'1.13 
ceased to love in return. He as;,{"H'l whether God t s love f,'!" the s1n .. 
nar would be 30 un3hi~keable if it dap-.ended upon man's love for Him. 
"~nen the sinner proudly cries out to God that he has stooned Iovine 
Him, God's freedom still lo~es with an infinite love. 
The point cf 8:'I:;:ho..9i8 1s that eternal lovE':) aoes not settle 
'..tpon ths ')()ss0s8ion ·)f an indlvidual. Only ~vhen :tt :ls a d'..1ty 
to love, only t:1en i;.; love everlasttnf~lJ s·Jcured a.gainst des9air. 
~espalr 113 3 disproportion In bel~I; 11B~~oportion is sin; and sin 
[ •• IiJ 
17 Ibid .• 
-
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is the suboti tutlon cf a cIteatu,re for God. So Klerkega.nrd con-
cludes: "Despair consIsts in laying hold on un indivIdual with 
:Lnflnlte passion; fo::." unless one 13 desperate, one ca.n lay hold 
only on the etornal Vii th inflnI ta passion. ,,18 Again nn(~ aC;ain he 
rctu~ns to the relatIonship between God ~ld man which is the first 
ot all relatIonships. God holds priority over mil-fl. s belng :::nd 
10":0. "Priori tyff is hel"'e used in tho jur:i.dlcal Gense. for God haa 
a r-ight to men. So although a man' 5 heart is truly free when he 
freely c:h,res his love to another, this is not the prim.a.ry note of' 
l:l.an'S love fo;- God. The pr1ma1"Y note 1s that man's hoart is first. 
of all a bound heart. Man is mad.e tor God and must choose to love 
.,<01. 
G-o:i • Consequently, man t:1ust k..'10W hhnsolf as lnfini tely bound, and 
then the talk about treedo.t:1 may beeln.19 
Dialeotica.l f:reedom deiies definition. Klerkegaud himself 
tried to define it when he saId that~tbo self is a synthetic r9-
• 
latton, and freedom is that ~.n the relation which relates 1 tself 
to 1 tself. But it ttequ1res ~i1ueh refl action and much ;reading 01' 
this melancholy Dane to understand what he meant by this defini-
tion. 
19rbid., p. laO. 
-
CHAP'em IV 
Closely oonneoted to the pI'oblem ott freedom in Kierkegaard 
is the equally subtle problem 01' Divine providence, or as his 
English translators have agreed to render it. the problem of 
governance. In many respects, discussions of these two problems 
naturally intertwine. Indeed, Kierkegaa.rd himself often treats 
of thel'll 1n relationship to one another, or even as though they were 
the same realIty. To prooeed one step further, it may well be true 
that he actually did unde.t"'stand them to be one rea11 ty--viewed un-
der two different aspoots. This reality would be the relatIonship 
of man to God. wherein God draws man to Himself, and man responds 
with t'reedom. ~VhatevGrthe ca.se may be, ... it is certa.in thab S.K. 
consldered.;overnance baSically important to any full ex.planation 
of his life. Governance gave him the vcoation of a rell~~lous vI-
tel', and whethel:' he was oonsoious of it or not at the time, he 
later felt It had been governanoe directing his entire life to that 
end. Obviously. 9. d1scus$lon of governance at this point would 
cast further light upon our pl'*oblem of freedom, but we cannot hope 
completely to lay bare the subtlety of this question. The problem 
of reoono11 ing providence with human freedom baffle:i man's intel-
lect oenturies before Kierkegaardts birth, just as it oontinues to 
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do so today" Thls antinomy 1s present in the most InsienifloaniJ 
human action. and it reaches its olimax in the m.ystery of the 01'\1 .. 
c :~fix1on. It OA:r be that man will never understand this problem. 
u.ntil he sees it fer the first time in the light c1: the Beatifio 
Vision. Nevertheless, n brief exposition of whet S.K. felt gover-
;;:..nce to be may help us understand dialectioal freedom. 
Predostination lorced 1 taolf upon r.: .K .. t s thou[;ht as e arl:y 
0.0 1834, when he wa.s only twenty-one years old. At that time he 
rote: "From overy pcdnt of' view the conoept predestination li'U!iy 
be c()nslderl~d EtS an aborticn, for hs.vlng unquestionably Hrlsen in 
. 
order to j;"elate freedom and Godts omnipotence it solves the riddle 
by denylng one of the conoepts Hnd ccn~)equontl:r explains noth"-ne. tt 
It tool<: Klel~kq~o.ard twelve :rear~ to solve this rid.dle to his own 
sat1sfact:ton. In tho l.ntol~vonlns poriod he ha.d expex-1.encod a grea 
deal of life, und no doubt it \Va.s reflect10n on thlsper::lonal ex-
'. 
peri&nce that !:lado him wrIte in 1846! 
The Greatest good which can be done to any bein,~, greater the. 
8l11' end to which it Call be created, 18 to make it tree. In 
order to be able to do t~tut omnipotenoe is necesaary. That 
..,111 sound OUJ.'liou., alnoe or all things omrdpot ... e. so at 
least 1. t would seem, should ma.ke thin~;s dependent. B:).t it ... 
rlght17 conaidett omnipotence, then. clearll 1 t m.ust have the 
quality or so taking itself baok in the very nlanlfestatlon of 
1. ta all-powerfulne •• that the .%'Gsul t8 ot thi. act ot the QIIn! 
potent can be independent. That is why one man ca.nnot make 
anothep man quite t".., b eoause the one who has the pow •• 1. 
imprisoned in it and consequently always has a false r-elation 
to him whom he wishea to tre.. That is Wal there 18 a tin1te 
solf-Iove In all tln1 te power (talent and so f(}rth)., Onmlpo-
tence alone oan take i tsel!' back whlle g1 v1ng·. and this relt\-
~ /" , ~ ~~l.t ~.l. 
tlonshlp 1s nothing else but tho independenoe of the recipi-
ent. God t s omnipotenoe is therefore hi:3 £l;oodne~)s. li'or good-
ness means to give absolutely, yet in such a way that by ta~ 
oneself baok one makes the reoipient independent. From finite 
power comes only dependence. and omnipotenoe alone can make 
something independent. oan create somethinz; out of nothIng 
whioh endure~ of ltself, because omnipoeence 1s always taking 
itself baok. 
~his explains how it is possible .for an omnipotent God to create a 
:tree creature. and we have already spent a good deal of at'fort try ... 
lng to understand human free·dam.. But the problem of the real inter It-
~ctlon between Omnipotence and freedom still remalns. Onoe again 
we face the same type of problem that has occurred t fmc after time 
in our study of Kierkegaardian thousht. The abstract formulation 
1s logioally sound as in the passa:;e we have jU3t quoted, but such 
~ formulation was t''1erely an H,fterthought for S .. K. IUs primary con-
oern was to explain reality as we meet it in everydny life. Oon-
isequently, when he looked at the problem of governance, he looked 
at it under this same light. 
Reading through Klerkegaard t s Point .2! y!!.!, the reader dis-
oovers that the author was extrem.ely conscious of the faot that 
governanoe had played a part in his life. S .. K. does not concern 
!limself in this work wi th the question of how [~overnance is p03si~ it 
but only with the fact of its being_ So he writes: "Since I be-
came an author I have never for a sinc;le day "1ad the experience I 
~ear others compla1n of, namely, a luck of thou::;hts or their fallur ~ 
~o present themselves. If that were to happen to me, it would 
2 Ibld.,p. 180. 

100 
£: the produotiv1ty.'t~ He compares this education prooess to the 
aotivity of the civil police with this one difference: governance. 
~la identlfied wi th God who is perfect Love, employs a person only 
~or the sake of love. The ;::.nalogy of governanoe with the oivil 
police is grounded in S.K.ts conviotion that he was under the most 
, 
~ncondltional ob$d1ence to governance.o 
Not only was Kierkef:aard oonsoious of this Dlvlne PowtJr di-
rectinc h1s life, He was thankful for it. He desired it. Often 
he refleated upon the horrible ;'onsequenees of a life :3 at adrift b~ 
God. "Be grateful to Him if tl1rough the use of mildness or of se-
veri ty He teaohe3 you to bring your \vl11 into agreement with Him--
how fearful if' He IilAkes no move to arrest your oourse. 1t7 No indi-
vidual would be able to traverse the sea of' lire nnd eventually 
find the port of heaven dld God not d1reot him. S.K .. believed that 
when a man feels the r~ssllre of God'. hand at his back, the Divine 
• 
" 
purpose is not to crush him to the earth, but to push him forward. 
So he teaches that a man feeling this pressure should praise God# 
80 he finds h1rnself--God be praised' (for away with cowardly 
talkS rmd aocursed by pal try Jestingl where only congratu-
lation is in plaee)--he finds himself--Ood be pralaedl--ln a 
serious strait. It depends upon divine governanoe (gut let 
us never forget that here 1s love) how many holos. (If I mAy 
speak thus) it will bore in hi.m, how hot (if I may speak thus ~ 
it will heat the oven In whlch like gold he is to be tried. 
5Ibid., p. 73. 
-
6Ib1d •• p. 88. 
-
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Perhaps he is yet far from having a complete sUl"vey of.' the 
true situation. for govePnauoe is love, and though bis proba-
tion ia taken seriously, the,~e 1s nothing oruel about this 
seriousness, whioh deals gently ~ith a man and never tempts 
him beyond his capacity to bear. 
Kierkegaard provides a beautiful explanation of this 1n-
~eraction between Governanoe and human freedom in his disoourse 
"He Will Draw All Thlnr:;s to Himself." As in so many other instan-
aes, his method here is theologioal rather than philosophioal. He 
.peels that a man who leads a true life will have a connaturallty 
~1 th truth, and autornatioally assent to it when he finds himself 
~n its presenoe.. Experienoe, he believed, was the only proof, and 
~hls. not in the sense of rationalistic poverty, but rather in the 
Isense that ex.perience 1s unique in i ts·,ower to convince. 
There are several ways by which one being may draw another 
~o itself, depending on the nature of the obJeot drawn. For in-
~tance, a magnet is able to draw iron,to itself. But as the iron 
~a not a self', the entire nctivity is a simple action on the part 
pf the magnet.9 In the case of a self drawing another self, the 
~otlon 1s composite and therefore more complicated. 10 Aetually, 
nsteud oi' being restricted by being drawn toward anothor self J man 
Ftinda a fuller expression of freedom in th1. s "'<ctt vi ty: 
Furthermore, wi th a deep,:;r understand1ng o.f the (;l1ltter, what 
is meant by drawing to itself depends upon the nature of what 
8~ralnl~~ in Chri~tl~nitl' p. 189. 
9Ibld •• p. 159. 
-
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is to be drawn, If it is in itself a self, thon the 
phIlasa 'to draw truly to oneself t t cannot mean merely to draw 
it away fl"om LHJin,.:; its own self, to draw it in such a way that 
it loses its own existence by being drawn into that which 
drd..ws it unto :i.tseli'. l!o, in the elise of that which is truly 
a self; to be drawn in suoh a way 1s 8.i?;aln to be deceived. 
Th1s, the deceit, will doubtless he the Iii.st thing to come to 
evidence; yet this last is what ought first to be said, and 
said at once: tIt decel'.;es'. No, when that which 1s to be 
draw'n Is in itself e. selt, the I'eal moaning of truly drawing 
to oneself Is, first to ~e1p it to beoome truly its O\n1 self. 
so as then to draw it to one:Je1f, or it means to help it to 
become its Oivn self wI til £l,nd by the drawing of 1 t to oneself. 
--So here the meaning of truly drawing to oneself is duplex: 
first to m.nIca that Vltd.ch is to be drawn 1 ts oV'm self, and then 
to draw it to oneself.l1 
In tho light of this, we see th.at L~overnance enhances man t s f'reedoDl 
and in no way lessens it .. M.ants task in life is to beoome himself', 
and to do so requires n proper proportion between Infini tlza·tlon 
I Il..."ld actualization. Everyone will admIt from his own experienoe tha~ 
this 1s a delicate balance and quIte diffioult to achieve. Kierke-
gaard will GO one stop fUl"ther and say that it is impossible to 
achieve without Godts help. And this l:}elp is governance. "In the 
first instance, God helps man to become himself by presenting to 
him a choice. He has opeated man, and so knows that man can only 
become frBe through the act.·~ vi ty of his pei.~sonal will chOOSing the 
good. Thus, Cod helps man.ocome free by r)resentin;~: to him a c;ood 
choioe, and thiS choice is Christ. 12 
Once God has he1pod :r1an to become free by proposing to him 
11~., p_ 159. 
12Ib1d., p. 160. 
-
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the choice of Christ, He then draws man to Himr:<elf by commanding 
this ohoice, To aohieve freedom, man must chooso Christian.tty. 
It we d.id not see this ::;tatement in tho light of' K1erlceCaard' a 
entire dialectic, it would oeem ntran~~e indsod. At first [lance. 
it is a copulation of contl"adictories. Hc.YWev6.!. .. should we not ex-
lPect just this'? After all, it ia only a paraphrase of w,~J.at we al-
ready conoeded to be a mystel7l namely, the interaction of·:over-
nanoe and freedom.. Perhaps Kierkegaard's solution to this riddle 
is nct the ultimate answer, but at least he Is consistent with him-
self'. No. more than thls, KieX'kegaardts solution in large measure 
satisfies the intellect, 'for it corresponds to our own experienoe 
which is S.K. f S cri tarian for tI'uth. 
At the beginning of this chapter, we stated that the abstraot 
formulation of any truth was only an afterthouc;ht for Klerkegaal~d. 
IUs primary ooncern was to expla.in rca11 ty as wo mae tIt 
1nevcryday life. This attit:.tde was t:~e source for hIs reaction 
against tlegelianLsm. !,Tot that he had no use for abstraction and 
systematic philosophy. On the ce.ntrc1"Y, such a methodical proce-
~ure is too much in evidence in h::s own thoui;~ht for anyone serious-
111 to acouse him on that account. No, his attaok acainst 110::;01 was 
Ibased on the fact that Hegel, and many othel"s, oonelude the.', r 
thought wi th abstrr~ctions, and theref'ore never come to - 1"1 ps wi th 
reality. ConsElquently, we would do S.K. an :tnjustice to leave this 
problem of [;':ovemance and freedom wi th nlerely the analytiC tre::;t .... 
Iment that has been presented so far. Hather than do thiS, let us 
104. 
turn 1"'01" a tinali.i1!ne to t'iEl 'Narks of Love wilOro he 13 discoUl'*s1ng 
..................... --
on God t S OOr,:L:lla:ldinant of lovo. 'fhls pussa....;e pulls togethoj;~ tl1e 
1n this thesis. nO}:'"!) he ;:;peaks of sorrow and love. He speaks of 
the DIvinG Corru.:ul.nd. And 1l.tldel'tneath it all 1s the llndel'standing 
or hU1I1an freedol1U 
Thou shalt sorrow 1s both true and b eautlfUl. I have no right 
to harden my heart ue;ainst the paln of life, for I ~ sor-
row; but nolther ~Hlve I tiw ri,},ht to.:ie spat!', for I ~ sor-
row. So also wi til love. You bave no rlg..ht to harden yourself 
agaInst this emotion, for thou shalt love; and just us little 
have you the right to eorrupt this reeling in you, for thou 
shalt love. You mUJt preserve the love ilnd you must ?,)!'oservo 
yourself, and in prel:.\ervin;.:; ~rourself preserve your love. 
There '.:\There the purely hUrilan would rush forth, the COr!l.landment 
retards} there where the purely human would lose courage, the 
commandment s trGngthens; there vlhe r~3 the purelY' human would 
beoome weary and prudent, the commandment enkindles and g1ves 
wisdom. The corn...1'landrnent consumes and burns up the unsOUl"ld-
ness 1n your love.13 
CONCLUDING UNSCD~NT~FIC POSTSCHIP{f 
As a mirror of KIE)1"kegasrdian freedom, this thesis leaves muoh 
to be desired. Perhaps with1n these pages the disproportion be-
~ween excess and suffioienoy parallels the disproportion of a 
~elanoholy aesthete. The sin here would be the sin of finitude, 
for this thesis falls faI' short of mirrorln[,~ the amazing j1ossibill-
ties within Klerkegaard1 s psychology 01.' pEH·son. That the r:1elan-
chol1 Dane actually possessed these :iosslbilitlos is a widely 800-
oepted fact ,today. His influenoe 1s widespl"end, and b eoause his 
thoug,ht Is neither a philosophy nor a theology" but a narriage ba-
tween the _0,. it need not supplant existinc; philo!lophies, but Qan 
well be their complement. Certainly this much may be said: al-
though this personalist philosophy may not be entirely palatable 
in some respeots, nevertheless "hen its defeats h~Jve been weeded 
out, there yet remains a large body of thou~~ht that is truth a.nd 
wisdom. 
¥rsn K1erkegaurd olaimed that he 'II as not a formal philosopher '" 
Perhaps this 1s true, but whethet* he was or not, he brought to 
~1g~t a truth which many formal philosophers had prev10usly passed 
by in darkness. 
105 
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